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0.  INTRODUCTION  
  
“Those  who  cannot  remember  the  past  are  condemned  to  repeat   it”.  This   is   true  also  
for  bridge  construction  and  therefore  my  research  is  focused  on  finding  changing  in  codes  due  
to  important  failures.  
The   compilation   of   specifications   began   in   1921   with   the   organization   of   the  
Committee  on  Bridges  and  Structures  of  the  American  Association  of  State  Highway  Officials.  
During   the   period   from   1921,   until   printed   in   1931,   the   specifications   were   gradually  
developed,   and   as   the   several   divisions  were   approved   from   time   to   time,   they  were  made  
available   in   mimeographed   form   for   use   of   the   State   Highway   Departments   and   other  
organizations.  
A  complete  specification  was  available  in  1926  and  it  was  revised  in  1928.  Though  not  
in  printed  form,  the  specifications  were  valuable  to  the  bridge  engineering  profession  during  
the  period  of  development.  The  first  edition  of   the  Standard  Specifications  was  published   in  
1931,   and   it   was   followed   by   the   1935(available   and   analyzed),   1941,   1944,   1949,   1953,  
1957,  1961,  1965,  1969(available  and  analyzed),     1973,  1977,  1983,  1989,  1992(available  
and   analyzed),   1996(available   and   analyzed),      and   1998(available   and   analyzed),   revised  
editions,  where  my  research  stop.  The  whole  number  of  editions  are  seventeen.  
In  the  past,  Interim  Specifications  were  usually  published  in  the  middle  of  the  calendar  
year,  and  a  revised   edition  was   generally   published   every   4   years.  In  United  States  
the   development   of   building   codes   and   standards   has   become   a   private-­‐sector   enterprise  
involving  federal,  state,  and  local  participation.  The  promulgation  of  codes  is  generally  based  
on   a   consensus   process;   any   individual   or   industry   organization  may   participate   in   the  
development   of   these   codes   and   related   deliberations.   The   purpose   is   to   provide   an  
acceptable  level  of  risk  with  respect  to  potential  hazards  and,  at  the  same  time,  safeguard  the  
economy.   A   code   or   standard   do   not   become   law   until   enacted   by   the   authority   having  
jurisdiction  (state,  city,  etc.).  
The  Standard  Specifications   for  Highway  Bridges  are  primarily  specifications   that  set  
forth  minimum   requirements  which  are  consistent  with  current   practice,  and  certain  
modifications  may  be  necessary  to  suit   local   conditions.  Factors  of  safety,   load   factors,  
and   assumptions   regarding   interaction   between   structural   components   used   by   designers  
may   or   may   not   reflect   actual   structural   performance,   but   rather   may   reflect   intended  
performance.  Provision  must  be  made  for  both  overload  and  understrength.  
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They   apply   to   ordinary   highway   bridges   and   supplemental   specifications   may   be  
required  for  unusual  types  and  for  bridges  with  spans  longer  than  500  feet.  Specifications  of  
the  American   Society   for  Testing   and  Materials   (ASTM),   the  American  Welding   Society,   the  
American   Wood   Preservers   Association,   and   the   National   Forest   Products   Association   are  
referred  to,  or  are  recognized.  
In  my  research  first  I  have  collected  all  bridges  failures  occurred  in  USA,  catalogued  by  
year,  type,  cause,  particular  details,  fatalities,  injuries,  collapsed  part  and  in  what  phase.  Then  
I  point  out  new  concepts  and  changes  in  code  due  to  this  failures.  There  is  also  a  brief  resume  




1.  AIM  OF  THE  WORK  
  
I  start  with  the  comparison  of  the  relevant  chapters  of  the  Standard  Specifications  for  
Bridge  Design  in  AASHTO  1996  and  LRFD  1998  Specifications  because  The  two  publications  
contain  the  specifications  to  be  followed  in  the  United  States  in  matter  of  bridge  design.  Then  I  
go   to   the   older   AASHTO1935   and   1969   to   capture   what   are   the   main   changes,   and   to  
understand  what  was  the  lesson  learned  from  a  failure,  that  brought  to  important  changes  in  
code.    
Although  only  two  years  elapsed  between  the  publication  of  these  two  Specifications,  
there  are  significant  differences  between  the  two  texts  both  at  general  and  specific  level.  First  
of   all,   just   looking   in   general   at   the  way   the   two  Specifications   are  written,   it   is  possible   to  
note  that  the  1998  version  is  much  richer  in  content  than  the  1996  one.  In  fact,  more  formulas  
for  the  different  verifications  to  be  performed  are  provided  as  well  as  more  coefficients  and  
indications  about  how  to  perform  the  verifications.  Moreover,  in  the  1998  text,  specifications  
are  explained  and  clarified  by  means  of  a  commentary  regarding  all  the  considered  subjects.  
As  a  consequence,  the  new  Specifications  are  more  detailed  than  the  previous  ones.  
However,   it   has   also   to   be   pointed   out   that,   due   to   the   abundance   of   specifications  
provided  and  to  the  fact  that  these  specifications  are  generally  performance  based  (whereas  
those   contained   in   the   1996   text   are   prescriptive),   the   new   version   leaves  more   room   for  
misinterpretations  with  respect  to  the  1996  Specifications,  that  are  simpler  and  more  logical.     
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2.  HYSTORY  
1. Design  philosophies  
Since   approximately   1931,   the   bridge   design   standards   prescribed   by   the   American  
Association  of  State  Highway  and  Transportation  Officials  have  followed  a  design  philosophy  
called  Allowable  Stress  Design  (ASD).  
Although   the   detailed   specifications   have   been   periodically   revised,   the   philosophy  
underlying  the  ASD  code  has  remained  the  same.  Developed  with  metallic  structures  in  mind,  
the  design  methods  are  based  upon  elastic   behavior .  Allowable  stresses  are  calculated  by  
dividing   the   material   yield   or   ultimate   strength   by   a   safety   factor.   The   safety   factors   are  
subjectively   defined,   conservative   values   that   attempt   to   account   for   the   uncertainty   in   the  
design  of  highway  bridges.  
In  the  1950s,  as  extensive  laboratory  data  on  failure  mechanisms  of  structures  began  
to  accumulate,  researchers  recognized  some  weaknesses  inherent  in  the  concepts  of  the  ASD  
code.   Allowable   stress   codes   do   not   permit   design   directly   against   the   actual   failure   limit  
states,  unless   those   limit  states  occur  within   the  elastic  range.  This   limitation  applies   for  all  
materials   where   inelastic   behavior   occurs   at   the   onset   of   failure.   Even   nominally   isotropic  
homogeneous  materials  such  as  steel  do  not  behave  in  a  linearly  elastic  manner  in  the  failure  
region,  either  as  a  consequence  of  material  nonlinearity,  or  instability,  or  some  combination  of  
the  two.  Thus  a  limit  state  design  approach  is  preferable.  
The   first   generation   of   AASHTO   code   to   use   a   limit   state  method   for   design   of   steel  
structures,  called  load  factor  design  (LFD),  was  introduced  in  the  1970s  (see  chapter  AASHTO  
1969)  as  an  alternative  to  the  ASD  specifications.  The  LFD  specification  retained  the  ASD  load  
model  and  did  not  consider  differing  levels  of  uncertainty  in  structural  resistance  models,  but  
for  the  first  time  permitted  design  directly  against  the  failure  state,  instead  of  against  fictitious  
allowable  stress  states.	  
In   addition   to   its   failure   to   adequately   address   failure   limit   states,   the   ASD   design  
approach   does   not   provide   a   consistent   measure   of   strength   through   the   use   of  
probabilistically  derived  safety  factors,  which  is  a  more  suitable  measure  of  resistance  than  is  
a   fictitious   allowable   stress.   In   particular,   since   the   safety   factors   are   only   applied   to  
resistance,   the   differing   levels   of   variability   in   the   various   load   components   cannot   be  
adequately  taken  into  account  within  the  ASD  format.  
The  effort  to  incorporate  LRFD,  resulted  in  the  first  edition  of  the  AASHTO  LRFD  Bridge  
Design   Specifications   (AASHTO,   1994).   This   LRFD   bridge   design   code   was   adopted   with   a  
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provision   to   consider   phasing   out   the   ASD   specifications   in   the   near   future.   The   second  
edition  was  introduced  in  1998,  and  the  third  edition  became  available  in  July,  2005    
In   addition   to   new   reliability   based   design   philosophies ,   and   the   introduction   of   a  
more   sophisticated   limit   state   approach   to   categorizing   structural   resistance,   the   AASHTO  
1998   contained   numerous      changes   in   loads   and   load   applications,   when   compared   to   the  
AASHTO  1196ASD  code.  These  changes  include  a  revamped  live  load  model,  a  newly  derived  
set   of   load   distribution   factors,   and   a   new,   and   slightly   more   conservative,   set   of   impact  
factors  (now  called  dynamic  load  allowances).  
  
Comparing   the  Specifications   for  Bridge  Design   in  AASHTO  1996  and   the  LRFD  1998  
Specifications,   it   is   possible   to   note   that  many   important   changes   and   some   improvements  
have  been  done.  In  particular,  the  most  relevant  change  is  represented  by  the  introduction  of  
loads   and   resistance   factors   (LRFD)   in   the   new   specifications,   and   the   transition   from  
allowable  stress  (ASD)  to  ultimate  load  method.    
The   loads  and  resistance   factors  are  very   innovative  because   they   introduce   the  new  
concepts  of  uncertainty  and  reliability,  changing  the  deterministic  bridge  design  philosophy  of  
the  previous  AASHTO  specifications.    
In   fact,   the   AASHTO   1996,   written   by   the   AISC   (American   Institution   of   Steel  
Construction),  can  be  defined  as  a  prescriptive  and  descriptive  code  with  directions  and  rules.  
It   applies   the   allowable   stress  method   (ASD),   that   combines   the   loads   by   the   use   of  
established  safety  factors.  All  this  makes  the  AASHTO  1996  simple  to  apply,  very  logical  and  
clear,   but   it,   actually,   does   not   take   in   account   the   complex   interactions   among   loads   and  
structure   and   seems   to   be   pessimistic   and   limitative.   This   is   because   of   the   assumption   of  
fixed   safety  margins  and  other   simplifications  also  due   to   the   lack  of  more   recent  powerful  
computational   tools   that   now   allow   complete   and   sophisticated   analysis.   Basically,   it   is  





where   !!   is  the  required  strength,  which  is  the  summation  of  the  load  effects  !!   (i.e.,  forces  
or  moments),  and  !!
!"
   is   the  design  strength,  which   is   the  nominal  strength  or  resistance  !!,  
divided  by  a  factor  of  safety  !".  The  allowable  stress  design  method  assumes  that  the  ultimate  
limit  states  will  automatically  be  satisfied  by  the  use  of  allowable  stresses.  Depending  on  the  
variability  of  the  materials  and  loads,  this  assumption  may  not  always  be  valid.  Moreover  in  
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this  method  it  is  assumed  that  all  loads  have  the  same  average  variability,  because  taken  into  
account  in  the  same  !".  Allowable  stress  design    very  often  come  out  to  include  the  inability  to  
properly  account  for  the  variability  of  the  resistances  and  loads;  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  level  
of  safety;  and  the  inability  to  deal  with  groups  of  loads  where  one  load  increases  at  a  different  
rate  than  the  others.  The  latter  condition  is  especially  serious  when  a  relatively  constant  load  
such  as  dead  load  counteracts  the  effects  of  a  highly  variable  load  such  as  wind.  
In  the  new  specifications  LRFD  1998,  written  by  the  ACI  (American  Concrete  Institute),  
safety   factors   have   been   replaced   by   factors   that   are   calibrated   and   based   on   stochastic  
analysis,  empirical  data  and  structural  reliability1  theory  to  describe	  the  uncertainty  of  loads  
and   resistance,   and   nonlinearity   of  materials.   The   introduced   concept   of   the  uncertainty   is  
very  powerful  and  allows  to  design  in  order  to  maximize  the  expected  useful  life  of  structures,  
improve  maintenance   characteristics   using  more   accurate   analysis  methods.   Uncertainty   is  
basically  associated  and  due  to  ignorance,  randomness  and  vagueness2.  It  has  been  taken  in  
account   by   including   safety   parameters   and   indexes   in   the   loading   combinations.   Those  
parameters  are  derived  by  the  above-­‐mentioned  reliability  theory  based  on  a  representation  
of   the   demand   of   design   loads   and   the   supply   of   resistance   using   normally   distributed  
functions.    
In   addition,   to   load   factors   that   increase   load’s   values,   the   LRFD   Specifications  
introduce  also  resistance  factors  that  reduce  the  actual  resistance  capacity  of  the  structure    
∑≥= iiin QRR γηϕ 	  
The   final   value   of   the   resistance   is   called      nominal   resistance	   nR ,   and   this   is   a   significant  
change  with  respect  to  the  previous  code  (1996)  that  accepted  to  satisfy  the  relation: QR 2≥ .	  
The  safety  factor  2  was  chosen  taking  in  account  the  (uni-­‐axial  tensile  strength)  behavior  of  
linear,  uniform  and  isotropic  materials  (mainly  steel,    because  the  code  was  written  by  AISC).  
On   the   contrary,   the   new   code   refers   also   to   behaviors   of   nonlinear   or   non-­‐homogeneous  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The structural reliability is the probability that a structural system is operational after the application of 
certain loads and external conditions. 
2	   Ignorance	   is	   the	  primary	  source	  of	  uncertainty	  and	   is	  due	  to	   insufficient	  data,	   like	  measurements	  about	  
the	   features	   of	   materials	   and	   structural	   behaviors.	   The	   randomness	   is	   related	   to	   unexpected	   nonlinear	  
behaviors	  or	  variations	  of	  the	  properties	  of	  materials	  and	  structures.	  Finally,	  vagueness	   implies	  fuzzy	  sets	  
because	  of	  qualitative,	  unclear	  or	  non	  specific	  input	  data	  or	  approximated	  models.	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materials,  like  concrete;  for  this  reason,  probabilistic  considerations  are  developed  for  making  
acceptable  the  relation  between  loads  (demand)  and  resistance  (supply).  
Finally,  another  main  aspect  of  the  design  philosophy  of  the  new  code  is  the  presence  
of   several  performance   levels   defined  by   limit   states.   Thanks   to   all   this   characteristics,   this  
performance  based  code  can  accomplish  and  satisfy  more  requirements  for  a  good  design  of  a  
bridge  but,  at   the  same   time,   it  becomes  more  complex,   sometimes  ambiguous,  and   is  often  
misinterpreted  by  designers  and  engineers.  
Limit  states  are  generally  defined  as  those  conditions  of  a  structure  at  which  it  ceases  
to   fulfill   its   intended   function,   and   can   be   divided   into   two   categories,   strength   and  
serviceability.  Strength  (i.e.,  safety)  limit  states  are  such  behavioral  phenomena  as  the  onset  
of  yielding,  formation  of  a  plastic  hinge,  overall  frame  or  member  instability,  lateral-­‐torsional  
buckling,   local   buckling,   tensile   fracture,   and   development   of   fatigue   cracks.   Serviceability  
limit   states   include   unacceptable   elastic   deflections   and   drift,   unacceptable   vibrations,   and  
permanent  deformations.  Design  criteria  should  ensure  that  a  limit  state  is  violated  only  with  
an  acceptably  small  probability,  by  selecting  the  load  and  resistance  factors  and  nominal  load  
and  resistance  values  that  will  never  be  exceeded  under  the  design  assumptions.  
Both   the   acting   loads   and   the   resistance   (strength)   of   the   structure   to   loads   are  
variables   that  must   be   considered.   In   general,   a   thorough   analysis   of   all   uncertainties   that  
might  influence  achieving  a  limit  state  is  not  practical,  or  perhaps  even  possible.  
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-­‐	  !∗and	  !∗are	  the	  mean	  values	  of	  the	  Gaussian	  variables	  !	  (supply)	  and	  !	  (demand)	  respectively;	  
-­‐	  !!!+!!!	  are	  the	  variances	  of	  the	  Gaussian	  variables	  !	  (supply)	  and	  !	  (demand),	  respectively.	  
The	   reliability	   function	   is	   directly	   related	   to	   the	  !	   coefficients,	  which	  multiply	   the	   acting	   loads.	  
Therefore,	   by	   means	   of	   !	   the	   random	   nature	   of	   supply	   and	   demand	   is	   accounted	   in	   the	  
verification	  of	  the	  structural	  elements.	  Moreover,	  the	  possibility	  to	  set	  the	  value	  of	  !	  according	  to	  
the	  considered	  case	  allows	   for	  a	  greater	   flexibility	   in	   the	  design	  process.	  These	  elements	  makes	  
the	   LFRD	   method	   more	   accurate	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   approaches	   provided	   in	   the	   1996	  
Specifications.	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Now  let’s  summarize  the  main  changes  in  the  AASHTO  editions  
AASHTO  (1939)   LRFD  (1969)  
Prescriptive  and  descriptive   Prescriptive  and  descriptive  
Deterministic   Deterministic  (first  concept  of  levels  of  
uncertainty)  
Very  very  Simple   Simple  and  logical  
Safety   Safety  
Allowable  Stress  Design  (ASD)   Allowable  Stress  Design  (ASD)+(LFD)  
No  consistent  measures  for  strength  with  
probability  safety  factors  
Load  combination  with  design  against  Failure  
limit  state  
  
AASHTO  (1996)   LRFD  (1998)  
Prescriptive  and  descriptive   Performance  based  
Deterministic   Uncertainty/  Probabilistic  analysis  
Simple  and  logical   Complex  and  often  misinterpreted  
Safety   Reliability  
Allowable  Stress  (ASD)+(LRFD)   Load  and  Resistance  Factors  (LRFD)  
Load  combination  with  more  sophisticated  















 The structural reliability is the probability that a structural system is operational after the application of 
certain loads and external conditions. 
	  Ignorance	  is	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  is	  due	  to	  insufficient	  data,	  like	  measurements	  about	  the	  
features	   of	   materials	   and	   structural	   behaviors.	   The	   randomness	   is	   related	   to	   unexpected	   nonlinear	  
behaviors	  or	  variations	  of	  the	  properties	  of	  materials	  and	  structures.	  Finally,	  vagueness	   implies	  fuzzy	  sets	  
because	  of	  qualitative,	  unclear	  or	  non	  specific	  input	  data	  or	  approximated	  models.	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2. Design  loads  
DEAD  LOADS:  
  
The  first  notable  difference  is   in  the  definition  of  the  dead  load.   In  AASHTO  1935  the  
dead  load  is  simply  considered  as  the  weight  of  the  structure  complete  (weight  per  cubic  foot  
give)  
  
The  snow  and  ice  are  not  considered  because  their  presence  decrease  the  other  live  loads.  No  
different  safety  factors  are  applied.  
In  AASHTO  1969  the  dead  loads  are  defined  in  the  same  way  of  the  AASHTO  1935  and  
also  the  material  have  the  same  property  except  for  the  timber.  
  
  
In  particular,comparing  AASHTO  1996  and  1998,  although  both  the  versions  define  the  
dead  load  of  a  bridge  as  the  weight  of  the  entire  structure  as  well  in  1935  and  1969,  including  
all   the   elements,   such   as   roadway,   sidewalks,   cables,   utilities,   exc.,   the   1998   Specifications  
provides   an   entire   paragraph   about   this   dead   load.   In   particular,   factors   such   as   water  
content,  compaction,  earthquake  effects,  overconsolidation  are  considered  and  specifications  
about  active  and  passive  pressures  and  friction  angle  are  included.  
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Dating  back  to  the  1935s,  AASHTO  had  used  two  basic   live   load,  defined  as  weight  of  
the  applied  moving  load  of  vehicles,  cars,  pedestrian,  models  to  approximate  the  vehicular  live  
loads  that  would  be  experienced  by  a  bridge:  the  H  design  trucks,  H20,  H15  H10  where  H15  
















In   the   1969s,   AASHTO   had   used   three   basic   live   load   models   to   approximate   the  
vehicular   live   loads   that  would  be  experienced  by  a  bridge:   the  H  and  HS  design  trucks,   the  
design  tandem,  and  the  design  lane  loading.  The  HS  design  truck,  or  standard  truck,  is  a  three-­‐
axle  truck  intended  to  model  a  highway  semitrailer.  
The  design  tandem  is  a  two-­‐axle  loading  intended  to  simulate  heavy  military  vehicles.  
The  design  lane  loading  primarily  consists  of  a  distributed  load  meant  to  control  the  design  of  
longer   spans   where   a   string   of   lighter   vehicles,   together   with   one   heavier   vehicle,   might  
produce   critical   loads.  On   the   other  hand,   in   the  AASHTO  ASD   codes  1996   and  1998,   these  
three  type  of  live  loads  are  the  same,  but  each  of  these  load  models  was  applied  individually.  
Subsequently,   AASHTO   used   the   results   of   the   truck   data,   together  with   a   statistical  
extrapolation   to   a   75-­‐year   design   life,   to   provide   the   basis   for   the   AASHTO   LRFD   design  
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loading.  The  results  of  researchers  of  these  studies  indicated  that  the  AASHTO  ASD  live  load  
models  consistently  underestimated  the  load  effect  of  vehicles  on  the  road  today.  
AASHTO   LRFD   1998   and   1996   contains   two   live   load   models   with   the   design   lane  
superimposed   upon   them,   the   design   truck   and   the   design   tandem.   This   is   expected   to  
produce  significantly  increased  design  loads.  
The   second   notable   change   in   vehicular   load   modeling   between   the   ASD   and   LRFD  
codes  is  the  method  used  to  approximate  the  live  load  amplification  due  to  dynamic  loading.  
The   dynamic   load   allowance,   formerly   referred   to   as   the   impact   factor ,   is   an   equivalent  
static  magnification  factor  to  be  applied  to  a  statically  applied  load  on  a  structure  in  order  to  
predict   the   additional   response   amplitude   resulting   from   the  motion   of   the   load   across   the  
structure.   In   a   highway   bridge,   the   actual   dynamic   response   amplitude   is   a   function   of   a  
number  of  factors.  Such  factors  include,  but  are  not  limited  to  bridge  span,  type  (continuous  
or   simple   span),   number   of   girders,   slab   stiffness,   bridge   damping,   deck   roughness,   vehicle  
mass,   vehicle   velocity,   damping,   number  of   axles,   suspension   system,   vertical   velocity  upon  
entering  the    bridge,  probability  of  coincidence  of  maximum  load  and  maximum  impact,  and  
position  of  load  relative  to  a  girder.  
In   an   attempt   to   simplify   this   dynamic   behavior,   the   AASHTO   ASD   specifications  
provided  an  impact  factor  that  varies  with  the  length  of  the  bridge,  but  is  to  be  no  greater  than  
0.3.   The   new   LRFD   specifications   simplify   the   model   even   further   by   providing   constant  
dynamic   load  allowances:  0.33   for  strength   limit  states  of  all  members,  0.75   for  deck   joints,  
and  0.15   for   fatigue.   The  highway   live   load  has   to  be   increased  by  an   impact   factor.  This   is  
when  the  highway  live  loads  are  applied  to  superstructures,  piers,  portions  above  the  ground  
line   of   concrete   or   steel   piles   that   supports   superstructures.   The   amount   of   the   above  










where   I   is   the   impact   fraction   and   L   is   the   length   in   feet   of   the   portion   of   the   span   that   is  
loaded  to  produce  the  maximum  stress  in  the  member.  
In   AASHTO   1969   it   is   only   written   to   take   into   account   dynamic   loads,   such   as  
centrifugal   force,  Lateral   forces  for  moving   live   loads;  centrifugal   force  10%  of  the   live   load,  
uplift  in  the  leeward  traffic  lane  with  a  constant  value  of  400  pounds  per  linear  foot  of  lanes  
and  800  if  there  is  also  railway  traffic.  
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  14	  
	  
The   manner   in   which   loads   are   transmitted   to   each   girder   is   a   third   modeling  
consideration  that  was  revised  with  the  adoption  of  the  LRFD  code.  The  response  of  a  bridge  
to  a  passing  vehicle  is  a  complex  deformation,  in  which  a  portion  of  the  load  is  transferred  to  
each  of   the   supporting  girders.  The  exact  proportion  of   the   load  carried  by  each  girder   is   a  
function  of   the  girder  spacing,  span   length,  slab  stiffness,   the  number  and   locations  of  cross  
frames,   and   the  placement  of   the   load  on   the   span.  Both   the  AASHTO  ASD  and  LRFD  codes  
permit  the  use  of  distribution  factor  methods  to  model  the  transfer  of  loads  through  the  slab  
to  each  girder.    
The   AASHTO   ASD   distribution   factors   were   originally   developed   using   orthotropic  
plate  theory,  and  the  resulting  equations  are  based  upon  the  girder  spacing  alone.    These  ASD  
distribution  factors  are  plagued  by  inconsistency,  sometimes  being  overly  conservative  and  at  
other  times  being  non-­‐conservative.    
  
In  the  LRFD  the  vehicular  live  load  is  given  by  the  combination  of  the  design  truck  or  
design  tandem  applied  together  with  the  design  lane  load.  
The  LRFD  design  truck  is  identical  to  the  Standard  HS20  truck  (AASHTO  1996).  Then,  
there  is  also  the  design  tandem,  that  consists  of  two  axels  (25  kip  each)  spaced  4  ft  apart.  In  
either  case,  the  transverse  spacing  of  wheels  is  taken  as  6  ft.  The  LRFD  design  lane  consists  of  
a   uniformly   distributed   load   of   0.64   klf   in   the   longitudinal   direction;   it   is   distributed  
transversely   over   a   10ft  width.   The   static   effects   of   the   design   truck   or   design   tandem   are  
multiplied  by  (1+ !"/100),  where  !"  is  the  dynamic  load  allowance.  It  takes  in  account  the  
dynamic  effects  and  replaces  the  previous  Impact  fraction  of  the  AASHTO  1996.  For  all   limit  
states,  except  Fatigue,  !"  is  taken  as  33%;  instead,  for  Fatigue  Limit  State,  it  is  taken  as  15%.  
This   dynamic   load   allowance   is   not   applied   to   the   design   lane   load,   but   only   to   the   design  
truck  or  tandem.  
  
In  the  LRFD  1998  Specifications,  it  is  important  to  note  that  to  consider  each  possible  
combination  of  number  of  loaded  lanes  is  considered  by  multiplying  the  vehicular  live  load  by  
the  corresponding  multiple  presence  factor.  
#  of  loaded  lanes   multiple  presence  factor  !  
1   1.2  
2   1.0  
3   0.85  
>3   0.65  
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For  the  AASHTO  1996,  a  similar  provision  is  taken  in  account  if  maximum  stresses  are  
produced  in  any  member  by  loading  a  number  of  traffic  lanes  simultaneously.  In  those  cases,  a  
percentage  of  the  live  loads  have  to  be  used.  
	  
#  of  loaded  lanes   Percentage  
One  or  two  lanes   100  
Three  lanes   90  
Four  or  more  lanes   75  
  
For  the  AASHTO  1969  
#  of  loaded  lanes   Percentage  
One  or  two  lanes   100  
Three  lanes   90  
Four  or  more  lanes   75  
	  
For  the  AASHTO  1935  
#  of  loaded  lanes   Percentage  
One  or  two  lanes   100  
More  than  two   -­‐1%  of  each  ft>18ft  
>  75  
  
Furthermore,   another   difference   is   found   between   the   AASHTO   1996,1969,1935   and   1998  
codes   in  the  definition  of  the  wind  load.   In  the  AASHTO  1996  (ASD)  Specifications  the  wind  
load   is  a  uniform  distributed   load  applied   to   the  exposed  area  of   the  bridge.  The  wind   load  
may  be  reduced  in  intensity  in  function  of  a  map  of  wind  speeds  for  the  U.S.  
In  the  LRFD  Specifications  in  AASHTO  1998  many  factors  have  to  be  calculated  for  the  
wind   load.   The  wind   direction   has   be   varied   to   determine   the   extreme   force   effect   in   the  
structure.  The  velocity  and  the  pressure  of  the  wind  on  the  structures  are  determined  by  the  
use  of  specific  formulas  in  function  of  several  factors,  also  applying  the  design  wind  pressure  
on  both  structure  and  vehicles  when  vehicles  are  present.  
In  1935  AASHTO   the  wind   force   is   simply  30  pound  per   square   foot  on  1!!   times   the  
area  of  the  structure  as  seen  in  elevation,  including  the  floor  system  and  railing  and  one  half  
the  area  of  the  trusses  or  girders  in  excess  of  two  in  the  span  
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   In   1969   AASHTO   the   wind   load   is   100psf   on   all   the   elements   in   the   orthogonal  
direction  of  the  bridge;  then  depending  on  the  type  of  structure,  the  angle  of  wind  direction  is  




Another   change   has   been   done   for   the   definition   of   the   earthquake   load .    The  
AASHTO  1996  considers  the  earthquake  load  as  an  equivalent  static  horizontal  force  applied  
at  the  gravity  center  of  the  structure  (EQ)  and  prescribes  to  use  response  spectrum  dynamic  
approach,  when  a  seismic  analysis  is  necessary  for  complex  structures.  
In   the   AASHTO   1998   LRFD   Specifications   the   earthquake   loads   are   defined   as  
horizontal   force  effects   determined  on   the  bases  of   the  elastic   response   coefficient,   and   the  
equivalent   weight   of   the   superstructures,   and   then   adjusted   by   the   response   modification  
factor  R.  The  seismic  force  is  defined  in  function  of  the  seismic  performance  zone,  the  type  of  
soil   and   other   response  modification   factors.   Then,   the   components   of   the   seismic   force   in  
each  direction  are  combined  using  the  Complete  Quadratic  Combination.  Dynamic  analysis  as  
the  dynamic  modal  analysis,  the  time  history  analysis  are  taken  in  account  by  the  LRFD  1998.  
In  1935  AASHTO  edition   there   are  no   seismic   loads   to   take   into   account;   also   in   the  
voice  “other  loads  when  they  exist”,  seismic  loads  are  not  written.  
In  1969  AASHTO  edition  appear  one  of  the  first  earthquake  stress  concept  as  follow  
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1.2.20.   “In   region   where   earthquake   may   be   anticipated,   provision   shall   be   made   to  
accommodate  lateral  forces  from  earthquake  as  follow  
EQ = CD  
Where  
EQ   is   the   lateral   force   applied   horizontally   in   any   direction   at   the   center   of   gravity   of   the  
weight  of  the  structure.  
D  is  the  dead  load  of  the  structure  
C  is  a  coefficient  (0.02  or  0..04  or  0.06)  depending  on  the  type  of  foundation.  Live  load  can  be  
neglected.  
In   recent   year   methods   of   designing   seismically   safe   bridges   and   analyzing   their   seismic  
failure  probability  have  progressed  rapidly.  These  development  have  often  been  initiated  by  
failure  occurrence.  
• Superstructure   must   be   tied   to   their   supports   and   foundations   in   such   a   way   that  
superstructure  cannot  fall  off  substructures  during  seismic  activity.  The  failure  of  the  
two-­‐level   San   Francisco   Oakland   Bay   Bridge   during   the   Loma   Prieta   earthquake   in  
1989,  when  a  section  of  the  upper  road  deck  fell  onto  the  lower,  was  due  to  the  fact  the  
bridge  had  been  completed  in  1957,  before  the  implementation  of  this  new  regulation.  
• The  bridge   foundation  must  be  designed   in   such  a  way   that  damage   through  ground  
liquefaction  cannot  occur  
After  the  earthquake  in  the  Northridge  area  of  Los  Angeles  in  1994  bridge  column  design  had  
to  include:  
• Careful  design  and  construction  of  the  links  in  column  reinforcement  
• Now  seismically  safe  design  is  at  least  as  important  as  analysis.  
Finally,   it   is   relevant   to   note   that   several   kinds   of   transient   load   are   included   in   the  
LRFD  Specifications  1998.  In  fact,  the  vehicular  braking  force  BR,  the  creep  CR,  the  vehicular  
collision  force  CT,  the  vessel  collision  force  VC,  the  pedestrian  live  load  and  the  water  load,  all  
of   them   are   not   considered   in   the  AASHTO  1996,   1969,   1935,   instead   in   the   LRFD  1998   is  
specified  how  to  consider  and  apply  those  loads  to  the  structure  of  the  bridge.  
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After   a   failure  of  Takoma  bridge,  many   studies  were  done  and  also  new  paragraph   (after   a  
more   detailed  wind   pressure   values   case   by   case)   appear   in   the   new  AASHTO   editions   for  
example  in  AASHTO  1969  
c)  overturn  force:   the  effect  of  forces  tending  to  overturn  structures  shall  be  calculated  and  
there  shall  be  calculated  under  group  II  and  group  III  of  the  combination  below,  and  shell  be  
added   an   upward   force   applied   at   the   windward   quarter   point   of   the   transverse  
superstructure  width.  This  force  shall  be  20  pounds  per  square  foot  of  deck  and  sidewalk  plan  
area  per  group  II  combination  and  6  pounds  per  square   foot   for  group  III  combination.  The  
wind  direction  shall  be  at  right  angles  to  the  longitudinal  axis  of  the  structure.  
Group  II  and  Group  III  are  those  combination  where  there  is  the  wind  load  on  the  structure    
Group  II:  D+E+B+SF+W  
Group  III:  D+L+I+E+B+SF+LF+F+30%W+WL+CF  





W=wind  load  on  structure  
WL=wind  load  on  live  load  –  100  pounds  per  linear  foot  
LF=longitudinal  force  from  live  load  
CF=centrifugal  force  
SF=Stream  flow  pressure  
In  AASHTO  1935  there  are  no  explicit  concepts/paragraph  that  explain  what  are  the  range  of  
serviceability   vertical   displacements/uplifting;   After   Mississippi   in   Chester,    Il l inois  
1944,  where  the  failure  occurs  due  to  excessive   uplifting  wind   load  not  considered,  in  
the   1969   edition   there   is   explicitly   a   new   paragraph   1.2.16   “provision   shall   be   made   for  
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adequate   attachment   of   the   superstructure   to   the   structure   should   any   loading   or  
combination  of  loading,  increate  by  100  per  cent  of  the  live-­‐plus-­‐impact  load,  produce  uplift  at  
any  location  
  
AASHTO  (1939)   LRFD  (1969)  
Live  load:  H+Design  lane   H+HS+Design  lane+Design  tandem  
LL  Uniformly  distributed   LL  Uniformly  distributed  
No  Impact  Factor   Impact  factor  only  dependent  on  Length  of  
the  span  and  <0.3  
Wind  load:30psf   From  18  to  100psf  depending  on  type  
of  structure  and  direction  
Allowable  Stress  Design  (ASD)   Allowable  Stress  Design  (ASD)+(LFD)  
Earthquake  load:  NO   Earthquake:  Equivalent  lateral  force  
No  transient  Loads   No  transient  Loads  
  
AASHTO  (1996)   LRFD  (1998)  
H+HS+Design  lane+Design  tandem   H+HS+Design  lane+Design  tandem+Design  
Truck  
LL  Uniformly  distributed   3  loads  applied  individually  
Impact  factor  only  dependent  on  Length  of  
the  span  and  <0.3  
Impact  factor  depends  on  many  factors  and  it  
is  from  015  to  0.75  for  different  limit  states  
From  18  to  100psf  depending  on  type  of  
structure  and  direction  
Depends  on  direction,  velocity,  
pressure  
Allowable  Stress  (ASD)+(LRFD)   Load  and  Resistance  Factors  (LRFD)  
Earthquake:  Equivalent  lateral  
force+Response  spectra  
Earthquake  elastic  response  
coeff+equivalent  weight+R  response  
modification  factor  
No  transient  Loads   Transient  loads:  BR+CR+CT+VC  
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3.  Load  combination  and  Load  distribution  (longitudinal  and  transverse)  
STIFFNESS  AND  FLEXIBILITY:  
  
In   an   attempt   to   more   accurately   model   the   distribution   of   loads ,   there   are  
developed   the  LRFD  distribution   factors,  which  consider  span   length   and  girder  stiffness   as  
well  as  girder  spacing.   It   is  difficult   to  predict  how  the  use  of  LRFD  distribution   factors  will  
affect   the   final   design   moments   and   shears,   in   view   of   the   relatively   inconsistent   results  
produced   by   the   ASD   distribution   factors.   If   the   remainder   of   the   design   specification  
remained   unchanged,   the   significantly   increased   vehicular   live   loads   would   likely   lead   to  
stronger   and   stiffer   structures.   However,   these   changes   in   the   load   approximations   are  
accompanied   by   new,   strength-­‐based   design   procedures.   Such   strength-­‐based   procedures  
have  often  led  to  more  flexible  structures  in  the  past,  so  it  is  uncertain  whether  the  increased  
loads  will   result   in  a  comparable   increase   in  bridge  strength  and  stiffness.  The  revised   load  
distribution  factors  further  complicate  the  situation.  A  key  issue  in  the  application  of  the  new  
specification  is  the  flexibility  of  the  resulting  designs.  
For   a   number   of   years,   it   has   been   observed   that   some   steel-­‐concrete   composite  
bridges   that   have   been   designed   according   to   AASHTO   ASD   standards   have   a   tendency   to  
display  excessive  flexibility.  While  the  term  “excessive  flexibility”  is  somewhat  subjective,  and  
is  often  based  upon  the  perceptions  passengers   in  autos  on  the  bridges,   there  may  be  more  
serious  consequences  for  the  bridge.  Some  bridges  that  have  been  observed  to  be  too  flexible  
also  appear   to  have  exhibited   relatively   rapid  deterioration  of  wearing   surfaces,   and  higher  
than  expected  maintenance  costs.  Whether  there  is  any  direct  relation  between  the  perceived  
flexibility  of   the  bridge  and   the  apparently  higher   rates  of  deck  deterioration   is  not   certain,  
but  is  consistent  with  observations  that  have  been  made  over  a  number  of  years,  by  numerous  
engineers.  
A  summary  paper  (ASCE,  1958)  indicated  that,  based  upon  available  data  at  that  time,  
bridge  deflections  were  not   considered   to  be  a   serious  problem,   except   insofar   as  potential  
passenger/pedestrian  discomfort  were  concerned.   In  recent  years,  most  of   the  work  related  
to  deflection  control  has   focused  upon   the  passenger/pedestrian  discomfort  question.  Little  
work  on  any  relationship  between  durability  and  bridge  flexibility  appears  to  have  been  done  
since   that   time,   although   one   of   the   recommendations   of   ASCE   (1958)   was   specifically  
directed  toward  addressing  this  question.  However,  in  the  intervening  years,  there  have  been  
significant   changes   in   the  design  of   bridges.  The  development  of   LFD   in  AASHTO  1996  and  
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more   recently   in   AASHTO1998   LRFD   design   have   lead   to   somewhat   lighter-­‐weight   and  
potentially  more  flexible  structures.    
Specifically,   the   loadings   upon   which   highway   bridge   design   has   been   based   for   a  
number  of  years  have  been  in  existence  since  at  least  AASHTO1969.  In  the  intervening  years,  
there  has  been  a  significant  observed  increase  in  average  daily  truck  traffic  (ADTT)  on  many  
roads,  and  a  significant  increase  in  the  observed  weights  of  many  trucks.  While  load  limits  are  
in  place  to  ostensibly  prevent  bridge  stresses  from  exceeding  design  stresses.  Therefore,  it  is  
likely  that  many  bridges  on  heavily  traveled  routes  are  subjected  to  more  cycles  of  high  stress,  
and  quite  possibly  to  higher  stresses  than  the  ASD  HS-­‐20  loading  is  intended  to  represent.  The  
correct  value  of  dynamic  load  allowances;  the  impact  factors.  
In   addition   to   the   presence   of   increased   vehicular   loadings,   trends   in   bridge   design  
over  the  last  50  years  have  tended  toward  more  flexible  bridge  structures,  so  the  L/800  limit  
for  the  design  with  the  AASHTO1969,  which  has  also  been  existence  for  many  years,  may  in  
fact   need   to   be  modified.   The   original   L/800   limit   appears   to   have   been   based   upon   non-­‐
composite  bridges,  and  the  calculated  deflections  for  such  bridges  were  based  upon  the  girder  
stiffness  only,  even  though  the  actual  bridges  displayed  considerable  composite  action  in  the  
field.    
More  recent  design  practice  has  explicitly   included  composite  behavior   in   the  design  
stage,   and   the   stiffness   estimates   have   been   based   upon   the   composite   section.   Therefore,  
application  of  the  L/800  deflection  limit  to  composite  bridges  may  tend  to  permit  significantly  
greater   flexibility   than  would   have   been   allowed   in   previous   “non-­‐composite”   bridges   that  
actually  displayed  significant  composite  action  (ASCE,  1958).  
Additional   trends   tending   to   contribute   to   greater   flexibility   include   use   of   higher  
strength   steels,   which   permit   the   use   of   smaller   sections.   Therefore,   it   is   important   to  
determine   just   how   important   the   optional   deflection   provisions   are,   and   whether   more  
stringent  guidelines  should  be  followed  in  some  circumstances.  
This   is   particularly   important   in   view   of   the   observed   flexibility   of  many   composite  
steel   girder-­‐slab   bridges,   and   the   apparent   tendency   of   some   composite   steel   girder-­‐slab  
bridges  toward  premature  deck  deterioration.   It   is   the  purpose  of   this  study  to  evaluate  the  
significance  of  those  changes.  
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The  LRFD  (1998)  Specifications  use  limit  states  instead  of  load  combinations  like  in  the  
previous  AASHTO  (1996)  Specifications.    
In   the   AASHTO   (1996)   several   Group   loading   combinations   for   Service   Load  Design  
and  Load  Factor  Design  (LFD)  are  defined  in  function  of  particular  sites  or  types  of  structure.  
For  each  Group  N,  the  group  combination  is  expressed  by  the  following  formula:  
!!"#$(!)   =    ( )[ ]....+⋅+⋅+++⋅ ECFILD ECLD ββββγ   
also  reported  on  the  3.22.1  of  the  code,  with  the  list  of  all  the  loads    
!  is  the  dead  load  
!  is  the  live  load  
!  is  the  live  load  impact  and  so  on  for  the  other  loads  listed  in  the  code  
!  are  the  load  factors  pre-­‐multiplier  
!  are  the  respective  coefficients.  
Whereas,   in   the   LRFD   Specifications   different   loading   combinations   are   defined   as  
function  of  the  Limit  State  that  it  is  required  to  achieve  and  satisfy.  These  limit  states  consist  
of  the  service  limit  state  (limit  state  that  requests  provisions  not  directly  related  to  strength  
or  statistic  but  to  the  experience),  the  strength  limit  state.  (limit  state  for  which  the  structure  
is  damaged  but   its  main  structural   functions  are  still   satisfied),   the   fatigue   limit   state   (limit  
state  that  consider  the  presence  of  cracks  due  to  applied  loads  but  that  prevents  the  fracture  
in  the  design  life  of  the  structure),  and  extreme  event  limit  state.  (limit  state  that  assumes  that  
the  return  period  of  loads  which  the  bridge  is  subjected  to  is  much  greater  than  the  design  life  
of  it,  i.  e.:  earthquake).    
In  particular,   in   the  code,   the   limit   state   is  defined  as   “a  condition  beyond  which   the  
bridge   or   component   ceases   to   satisfy   the   provisions   for   which   it   was   designed.”   Thus,   in  
example,   Strength   I   is   used   for   design   at   the   Strength   Limit   State,   when   there   is   a   normal  
vehicular   use   of   the   bridge   and   in   the   load   combination  do  not   appear   the  wind   and   other  
transient   loads;   instead   the  Extreme  Event   I   associated  with   the  Extreme  Event  Limit   State  
includes  the  earthquake   in   the   load  combination;  exc.  All   the  non  conformity  to  all   the   limit  
state  is  considered  a  failure  (that  does  not  compulsorily  imply  collapse).  
These  loading  combinations  are  expressed  by:    
∑= iii QQ γη ,	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where	  	  
!! 	  is  the  load  modifier  that  takes  in  account  redundancy,  ductility  and  operational  importance  
factors;  
!! 	   represents   load   factors   that   pre-­‐multiply   the   force   effects   due   to   permanent   and  
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Table   of   fatigue   appear   after   failures   in   AASHTO   1992   and   repeated   also   in   the   AASHTO  
1998  after  the  failure  of  Silver   bridge,   chain   suspension   bridge   (Ohio  River)   due  to  
fatigue  failure.  
It  appears  the  fatigue  limit  state  and  the  follow  table  of  joint  to  prevent  failure:  
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Past  earthquakes  in  California  have  shown  the  vulnerability  of  some  older  structures,  
designed  with  non-­‐ductile  design  standards  to  earthquake-­‐induced  force  sand  deformations.  
The   Seismic   Design   Criteria   (SDC)   are   an   encyclopedia   of   new   and   currently  
practiced   seismic   design   and   analysis   methodologies   for   the   design   of   new   bridges   in  
California.   The   SDC   adopts   a   performance-­‐based   approach   specifying   minimum   levels   of  
structural   system   performance,   component   performance,   analysis,   and   design   practices   for  
ordinary  standard  bridges.  Bridges  with  non-­‐standard   features  or  operational   requirements  
above   and   beyond   the   ordinary   standard   bridge  may   require   a   greater   degree   of   attention  
than  specified  by  the  SDC.  
Many  of  the  methodologies  contained  in  the  SDC  have  evolved  from  the  seismic  retrofit  
program.  Some  of  the  procedures  are  major  departures  from  previous  practice  while  others  
are  slight  modifications  to  current  practice.  The  most  significant  change  in  design  philosophy  
for   new   bridges   is   a   shift   from   a   force-­‐based   assessment   of   seismic   demand       to   a  
displacement-­‐based  assessment  of  demand  and  capacity .  
The   force   approach   was   based   on   generating   design   level   earthquake   demands   by  
reducing  ultimate  elastic  response  spectra  forces  by  a  reduction  factor.  The  reduction  factor  
was  selected  based  on  structure  geometry,  anticipated  ductility,  and  acceptable  risk.  
The   newly   adopted   displacement   approach   is   based   on   comparing   the   elastic  
displacement   demand   to   the   inelastic   displacement   capacity   of   the   primary   structural  
components  while  insuring  a  minimum  level  of  inelastic  capacity  at  all  potential  plastic  hinge  
locations.   How   bridges   respond   during   earthquakes   is   complex.   Insights   into   bridge   behavior   and  
methods   for   improving   their   performance   are   constantly   being   developed.   Designers   need   to   be  
conscious  of  emerging  technology  and  research  .  
Bridges  are  categorized  as  either  Important  or  Ordinary  depending  on  the  desired  level  
of   seismic   performance.   The   Ordinary   category   is   divided   into   two   classifications   Standard  
and   Non-­‐standard.   A   bridge's   category   and   classification   will   determine   its   seismic  
performance   level   and   which   methods   are   used   for   estimating   the   seismic   demands   and  
structural   capacities.   The   seismic   design   criteria   for   Important   bridges   and   Ordinary   Non-­‐
standard  bridges  shall  be  developed  by  the  project  design  team  on  a  case-­‐by-­‐case  basis,  and  
approved  by  OSD  management.     
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4.  Load  distribution  (longitudinal  and  transverse)  
	  
In   the   distribution   of   loads,   there   are   several   differences   between   the   two  
Specifications,  some  of  them  can  be  considered  minor  differences,  others  are  substantial.    
In  the  AASHTO  1996  Specifications,  in  calculating  shear  and  bending  moments  in  longitudinal  
beams,  the  longitudinal  distribution  of  the  wheel  load  is  usually  not  taken  in  account.  While,  
the  lateral  distribution  of  wheel  load,  in  calculating  shear  has  to  be  that  produced  by  assuming  
the   flooring   to   act   as   a   simple   span  between   stringers   and  beams.   For   other   loads   in   other  
positions  on  the  span,  the  distribution  for  shear  has  to  be  determined  using  the  method  also  
specified  for  the  moments.    
The   lateral   distribution   of   wheel   load   in   calculating   live   load   bending   moments   for  
interior   stringers   and  beams  has   to   be   considered  by   applying   the   fraction   of   a  wheel   load  
(both  and  rear)  to  the  stringer.  On  the  code  a  table  reports  these  fractions  of  wheel  loads  that  
are  expressed  in  function  of  the  kind  of  floor  and  the  number  of  traffic  lanes.  In  the  case  of  a  
span  with  concrete  floor  supported  by  4  or  more  steel  stringers,  the  fraction  of  the  wheel  load  
has  to  be:  









where  !  is  defined  as  the  average  stringer  spacing  in  feet.  
For   multi-­‐beams   precast   concrete   bridges,   conventional   or   prestressed,   the  
longitudinal  distribution  of  wheel   load  has  always  not   to  be   considered;  while   the   live   load  
bending  moment   for   each   section  has   to  be  determined  by  applying   to   the  beam   the  wheel  
load  fraction  to  the  beam  (both  front  and  rear):  
! !  
!  is  the  width  of  the  precast  member  
!  is  a  constant  based  on  the  properties  of  the  bridge.    
All   these   formulas   for   the   distribution   factors   provide   good   results   for   bridges   of  
typical  geometry,  but   they  are  not   so  accurate  when  bridges  have  no  common   features  and  
parameters,  i.  e.,  when  relatively  short  or  long  span  bridges  are  considered.    
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AASHTO   LRFD   Specifications,   instead   are   more   precise;   consequently   the   formulas  
used  for  live  load  distribution  factors  are  more  complex  and  account  for  parameters  such  as  
span   length,   girder   spacing,   cross-­‐sectional   properties   of   the   bridge   deck,   in   particular,  
flexural  stiffness  and  torsional  stiffness.  Furthermore,  it  is  important  to  notice  that  LRFD  code  
computes   the   live   load  distribution   factor  per   lane   rather   than  per  wheel  as   in   the  AASHTO  
1996   Specifications   and   that   LRFD   also   includes  multiple   presence   factors   in   the   live   load  
distribution  factors.  Here  below  are  reported  the  distribution  live  loads  per  lane  for  bending  
moment  in  the  interior  beams:  































































3.5  !"   ≤ ! ≤ 16  !":  spacing  of  primary  members;  
20  !" ≤ ! ≤ 240  !":  span  length;  
4.5  !" ≤ !! ≤ 12  !":  depth  of  concrete  slab;  
!!:   longitudinal   stiffness   parameter   depending   on   the   area   of   the   cross-­‐section   and   on   the  
moment   of   inertia   of   the   beam   (not   all   these   parameters   are   considered   by   the   AASHTO  
1996).  
Regarding   the   transverse   distribution   of   the   wheel   load   in   calculating   the   bending  
moments   in   floor   beams,   the   AASHTO   1996   does   not   consider   it.   Instead,   if   longitudinal  
stringers  are  omitted  and  the  floor  is  supported  directly  on  floor  beams,  the  transverse  beams  
have  be  designed  for   loads  determined  by  applying  to  the  stringer  a   fraction  of     wheel   load,  
that  is  a  function  of  S,  spacing  of  floor  beams  in  feet  and  changes  its  expression  according  to  
the   kind   of   floor.   In   the   code   is   reported   a   table   for   those   distribution   of   wheel   load   in  
transverse  beams.  
In   the  LRFD  Specifications,   for   flexural  moments  and  shear,   if      the  deck   is   supported  
directly  by  floor-­‐beams,  the  transverse  floor-­‐beams  can  be  designed  for  loads  determined  in  
accordance  with  a   table  reported   in   the  code  that  consists  of   the   fraction  of     wheel   loads   to  
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each   floor  beam  in   function  of   the  type  of  deck  and  of  S.   It   is  very  similar   to   the  same  table  
reported  in  the  old  code  (1996),  above  mentioned.  Instead,  in  LRFD,  the  live  load  per  lane  for  
shear  in  interior  beams  can  be  determined  by  applying  the  lane  fractions  specified  in  another  
table   in  the  code,   in  functions  of  the  type  of  superstructure,  cross-­‐section,  number  of  design  




In  the  following  list  of  bridge  failure  it  is  written  what  was  the  cause.  I  would  like  to  point  out  
that  in  all  bridge  failures  there  are  not  only  one  cause,  but  several  cause  are  responsible  for  
failures;  very  often  nothing  would  happened  if  only  one  hazardous  event  occur.  Obviously  it  is  
possible  to  prioritize  these  failures  and  very  often  determine  what  is  the  trigger  of  failure.  
The  most  common  list  of  cause  can  be  classified  as  
− Failure  of  foundation  
− Failure  due  to  unusual  effect  or  impact  
− Collapse  during  construction  or  dismantling  
− Failure  during  testing  
− Insufficient  load-­‐bearing  capacity  without  other  recognizable  cause  
Where      there   could   be  mistake   in   design,   detailing   and   erection,   flaws   in  maitenance,   and  
material  and  natural  disaster.  
In   the   following   list  of  bridge   failures,   the  causes  are  selected   fro   the  previous  classification  
after  a   forensic   investigation.  These  can  provide   information  and  material   to  affect  eventual  
changes   in  design  and/or  construction  practices,   codes,   standards,  oversight  and  regulatory  
procedures.  
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3.  LIST  OF  BRIDGE  FAILURES  
  
Cable  suspension  bridge  near  Wheeling  (Ohio  River),  1854  
Cable  suspension  bridge  Lewiston-­‐Queenston  (Niagara)  
Ashtabula  (cast  iron)  bridge,  Ohio,  1876  
Farmington  Bridge  Failure,  Connecticut,1878  
Truss  bridge  near  St.  Charles  (Missouri  River),  1879  
(The  Tay  disaster  between  Dundee  and  Wormit  (Scotland),  1879)  
2-­‐span  truss  bridge  near  Fish's  Eddy,  New  York,  1886  
Bridge  over  Wabash  River  crossing  Toledo  St.  Louis  and  Kansas  City  Railway,  
Bluffton(Indiana),1886  
The  iron  Ducannon  bridge,  Pennsylvania,  1886  
Hilton  bridge  between  Wilmington  Columbia  and  Augusta  railway  (North  Carolina),  1886  
Pratt  truss  on  the  New  York  Ontario  and  Western  railway,  1886  
Iron  Whipple  truss  over  Petewawa  River,  Pembrook  (Ontario)  1886    
Bridge  near  Louisville,  Nashville  (Alabama  River),  1887  
Bussey  bridge  disaster  near  Forest  Hill  (Boston),  1887  
Big  Otter  River,  Northfolk  and  western  Railway  (Virginia),  1887  
Small  wooden  bridge  in  North  Chatsworth,  Illinois,  1887  
Staunton  Bridge,  Virginia,  1887  
La  Salle  bridge,  New  York,  1889  
St.  George,  Ontario,  1889  
Bridge  crossing  the  Knoxville  Cumberland  Gap  and  Luissville  Railway  over  Flat  Creek,  1889  
The  Pekin  Peoria  and  Union  Bridge,  over  the  Illinois  River  (Illinois),  1890  
San  Bernardino  Bridge,  California,  1890  
(Moenchenstein  Disaster,  1891)  
Bridge  in  Chicago,  1892  
Covington  Bridge,  1892  
Denville,  Illinois,  1893  
Chester  truss  bridge,  1893  
Louisville  truss  bridge,  1893  
Two  span  of  a  street  railway  bridge  in  Saginaw,  Michigan,  1894  
Bedford  Bridge,  Ohio,  1896  
Bridge  at  Point  Ellic,  Victoria  (British  Columbia)  
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Birningam  Bridge  over  the  Canhaba  River,  Alabama,  1896  
Bridge  near  Spartanburg,  South  Carolina,  1897  
Viaduct  in  Pottsville,  Pennsylvania,  1897  
Bridge  over  the  St.  Lawrence  River  near  Cornwall,  by  the  Ontario-­‐New  York  Railway,  1898  
Highway  Bridge  in  Shelby,  Ohio,  1898  
Porter's  Draw  timber  railroad  bridge,  north  of  Pueblo,  Colorado,  1904  
3  arches  Auburn  bridge,  California,  1911  
Glen  Loch  bridge,  Pennsylvania,  1912  
Coos-­‐Bay-­‐bridge  Oregon,  1924  
Ohio  Falls  truss  bridge,  1927  
Poughkeepsie  suspension  bridge,  1927  
4-­‐span  beam  and  slab  bridge  (Anacostia  River),  1933  
Steel  truss  bridge  near  Manassas,  Virginia,  1937  
Truss  bridge  near  Pagosa  Springs  in  Colorado,  1937  
Whiteson  Bridge  near  Minnville,  Oregon  (North  Yamhill  River),  1937  
Bridge  near  the  Niagara  Falls  (Niagara  River),  1938  
Plate  girder  Gerber  hinge  bridge  near  New  York,  1939  
Tacoma  Narrows  suspension  bridge,  1940    
Two  U-­‐section  bridges  south  of  Le  Mars,  Iowa  (Floyd  River),  1941  
2-­‐span  truss  bridge  over  Mississippi  in  Chester,  Illinois,  1944  
Swing  bridge  in  Boston-­‐Charlestown,  Massachusetts,  1945  
John  Grace-­‐Memorial  Bridge  (Cooper  River),  South  Carolina,  1946  
Bridge  near  Fresno,  California  (King's  Slough  River),  1947  
Rockport-­‐Bridge,  Maine  (Goose  River),  1947  
Hinton  truss  bridge,  West  Virginia,  1949  
Elbow  Grade  Bridge,  Willamette  National  Forest,  timber  truss,  1950  
Sullivan  Square  motorway  bridge,  Boston,  1952  
Eric  bridge,  Cleveland,  Ohio,  1956  
Interstate  29  West  Bridge,  Sioux  City,  Iowa,  1962  
Lake  Pontchartrain  bridge  (Lake  Pont),  1964  
Bridge  near  Charleston,  South  Carolina  (Cooper  River),  1965  
Silver  bridge,  chain  suspension  bridge  (Ohio  River),  1967  
Bridge  in  Illinois  (Kaslaski  River),  1970  
Buckman  Bridge  near  Jacksonville,  Florida,  1970  
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Chesapeake  Bay  Bridge,  Annapolis,  1970  
Motorway  bridge,  Junction  Antelope  Valley,  1971  
Motorway  bridge  near  Pasadena,  California  (Arroyo  Seco  River),  1972  
Sidney-­‐Lanier  Bridge  Brunswick,  Georgia,  1972  
Chesapeake  Bay  Bridge,  Annapolis,  1972  
Lake  Pontchartrain  bridge  (Lake  Pont),  1974  
3-­‐span  bridge  in  Lafayette  Street,  St-­‐Paul,  Minnesota,  1975  
21-­‐span,  Pass  Manchac  Bridge,  Louisiana,  1976  
Fulton  Yates  Bridge  near  Henderson,  Kentucky,  1976  
Benjamin  Harrison  Memorial  Bridge  near  Hopewell,  Virginia,  1977  
Bridge  over  Passiac  River,  Union  Avenue,  1977  
Interstate  17  Bridge,  Black  Canyon,  Arizona,  1978  
Southern  Pacific  Railroad  Bridge  (Berwick  Bay),  Louisiana,  1978  
K&I  Railroad  Bridge,  Louisville,  Jefferson  County,  Kentucky,  1979  
Alabama  Rail  Bridge,  Alabama,  1979  
Southern  Rail  Bridge,  Indiana,  1979  
Bridge  over  the  Hood  canal,  Washington,  1979  
Interstate  10  Bridge,  Phoenix,  Arizona,  1979  
Concrete  5-­‐span  box  girder  bridge  near  Rockford,  1979  
Sunshine  Skyway  Bridge  near  St.  Petersburg,  Florida,  1980  
Truss  bridge  in  Trenton,  Wisconsin  (Milwaukee  River),  1980  
Multiple  span  box  girder  bridge  in  East  Chicago,  Indianapolis,  1982  
Prestressed  concrete  precast  box  girder  bridge,  Saginaw,  1982  
Syracuse  bridge,  New  York,  1982  
Connecticut  Turnpike  Bridge  near  Greenwich  (Mianus  River),  1983  
Walnut  street  viaduct  over  Interstate  20  in  Denver,  Colorado,  1985  
Bridge  in  El  Paso,  Texas,  1987  
Schoharie  Bridge  (New  York),  1987  
Motorway  bridge  near  Seattle,  1988  
Box  girder  bridge  in  Los  Angeles,  1989  
Bridge  in  Baltimore,  1989  
Cypress  Freeway,  Oakland,  California,  1989  
Section  of  East  span  of  San  Francisco  Oakland  Bay  Bridge,  California,  1989  
Truss  bridge  in  Shepherdsville,  Kentucky,  1989  
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Herbert  C.  Bonner  Bridge,  North  Carolina,  1990  
Motorwaybridge,  jonction  Antelope  Valley,  1992  
Truss  bridge  in  Concord,  New  Hampshire,  1993  
Truss  bridge  near  Mobile,  Alabama,  1993  
Interstate  5  Bridge  in  Los  Angeles,  California,  1994  
3-­‐span  3-­‐girder  composite  bridge  near  Clifton  (Tennessee  River),  1995  
Twin  bridges,  Interstate  5  (Arroyo  Pasajero  River),  Coalinga,  California,  1995  
Walnut  Street  Bridge  in  Harrisburg,  Pennsylvania  (Susquehanna  River),  1996  
Bridge  near  Covington,  Tennessee  (Hatchie  River),  1999  
Bridge  over  motorway  in  Concord,  North  Carolina,  2000  
Queen  Isabella  Causeway,  Texas,  2001  
Historic  Tewksbury  Township  pony  truss  bridge,  Hunterdon  County,  New  Jersey,  2001  
Interstate  40  Bridge,  Oklahoma  (Webber  Falls),  2002  
Marcy  bridge  (Utica-­‐Rome  Expressway  project),  2002  
Turkey  Creek  Bridge,  Sharon  Springs,  Kansas,  2002  
Highway  14  overpass,  60  miles  south  of  Dallas,  Texas  (over  Interstate  45),  2002  
1900  built  Kinzua  Viaduct  (north-­‐central  Pennsylvania),  steel  bridge,  2003  
Imola  Avenue  Bridge,  Napa,  California,  2003  
Interstate  95  Bridge  in  Bridgeport,  Connecticut,  2004  
West  Grove  Bridge  in  Silver  Lake,  Kansas,  2004  
Interstate  20  Bridge  near  Pecos,  Texas  (Salt  Draw  River),  2004  
Lee  Roy  Selmon  Expressway,  Tampa  Bay,  Florida,  2004  
Bridge  near  Pawnee  City,  Nebraska,  2004  
Shannon  Hills  Drive  Bridge,  Arkansas,  2004  
Interstate  70  Bridge  in  Denver,  Colorado,  2004  
Interstate  10  Bridge,  Escambia  Bay,  Florida,  2004  
McCormick  County  bridge  east  of  Mount  Carmel  (Little  River),  South  Carolina,  2004  
Bridge  northwest  of  Norcatur  (Sappa  Creek),  Kansas,  2004  
Rural  bridge  near  Shelby,  North  Carolina  (Beaver  Dam  creek),  2004  
Laurel  Mall  Pedestrian  Bridge  between  the  parking  and  shopping  areas,  2005  
Wooden  bridge  in  Pico  Rivera  (California)  spanning  the  Rio  Hondo  flood-­‐control  channel,  2005  
Lake  View  Drive  Bridge,  Interstate  70  in  Washington  County  (Pennsylvania),  2005  
Eight-­‐lane,  1,950-­‐feet-­‐long  Interstate  35-­‐West  Bridge  in  Minneapolis  (Mississippi  River),  2007  
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4.  COLLECTION  DATA  
 
Cable suspension bridge near Wheeling (Ohio River) 
Year	   1854	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  	  (Storm)	  
Details	   Storm	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
  
It   was   the   largest   suspension   bridge   in   the   world   from   its   completion   in1849,   until   the  
Queenston-­‐Lewiston  Bridge  was  opened  in  1851.  It  was  the  first  to  span  the  Ohio  River  and  it  
was  designed  by  Charles  Ellet   Jr.,  who  also  worked  on   the  Niagara  Falls  Suspension  Bridge,  
failed   ten   years   later.   The  main   span   is   1,010   feet   (310  m)   from   tower   to   tower.   The   east  
tower  is  153.5  feet  (46.8  m)  above  the  low-­‐water  level  of  the  river,  or  82  feet  (25  m)  from  the  
base  of  the  masonry.  The  west  tower  is  132.75  feet  (40.46  m)  above  low  water,  with  69  feet  
(21  m)  of  masonry.  On  May  17,  1854  a   strong  windstorm  destroyed   the  deck  of   the  bridge  
through  torsional  movement  and  vertical  undulations  that  rose  almost  as  high  as  the  towers  
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Cable suspension bridge Lewiston-Queenston (Niagara) 
Year	   1864	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  	  (Storm)	  
Details	   Storm	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
 
Figure 3  
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Ashtabula (cast iron) bridge, Ohio 
Year	   1876	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   Very	  heavy	  train,	  snow	  storm,	  fatigue	  not	  excluded	  
Fatalities	   80	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  




This  bridge  was  a  two  truss,  double  track,  parallel  chord,  deck  bridge  with  the  web  members  
arranged   as   in   the   Howe   truss   (see   reference   http://www.past-­‐inc.org),   but   without   the  
vertical  end  post.  There  were  14  panels  of  11ft  each  with  a  height  of  19ft  9in.  The  distance  
between  centers  of  the  trusses  was  16ft  6in,  and  the  width  of  each  truss  was  34-­‐in.  
The   compression  members   of   the   bridge   have   no   lateral   connections  with   each   other,   thus  
acting  as  separate  long  slender  columns  that  cause  weaknesses  for  buckling.  
Another  weak  point  was  in  the  joints;  Castiron  joint  blocks  were  used  at  all  joints,  and  the  top  
chord   members   simply   butted   against   lugs   of   these   castings.   Moreover   the   details   of   the  
jounction  were  not  designed  in  detail  and  therefore  after  the  erection  the  beams  were  left  in  
contact  with  the  blocks  only  at  one  point,  so  they  acted  as  columns  with  free  ends.  
Therefore  the  structure  was  deficient  in  many  parts  and  the  failure  of  one  of  these  weak  parts  
was  the  trigger.  
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Figure 4:Joints acting like free hands 
 
 
Figure 5  
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Farmington Bridge Failure, Connecticut,1878 
Year	   1878	  
Type	   Rail	  (Combination	  of	  wood	  and	  steel)	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Material	  quality	  
Details	   Storm	  
Fatalities	   17	  
Injuries	   43	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
  
The  bridge  was  a  through  span,  162  ft  in  the  clear,  of  Howe  type,  the  chords  and  diagonal  of  
pine,  and  verticals  wrought  iron.  The  bridge  failed  under  a  double-­‐headed  ten-­‐car  Connecticut  
Western   Railroad   special   train   of   the   faithful,   returning   from   a   revival   held   in   Hartford,  
crosses   the   Tariffville   Bridge   over   the   Farmington   River   near   midnight,   and   the   structure  
collapses.   Both   locomotives   and   the   first   four   cars   plunge   into   the   ice-­‐covered   river,   killing  
seventeen  and  injuring  forty-­‐three.  Study  on  the  material  stress  show  that  the  members  were  
all  to  be  scant  of  material  and  besides  this  wooden  member  were  considerably  decayed.  State  
inspections  failed.  
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Truss bridge near St. Charles (Missouri River), Wreck 
Year	   1879	  
Type	   Rail	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Derailed	  train	  impact	  on	  bridge	  
Fatalities	   2	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
  
This  bridge  was  a  span  of  the  Howe  type.  It  was  cracked  after  the  derailment  of  the  bridge  of  a  
freight   train;   the   floor   beams  were   of  wood,   and   the   breaking   of   one   of   these   floor   beams  
caused  the  derailment  cars  being  thrown  against  the  trusses  causing  them  to  fall.  
  
 
Figure 6  
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The Tay disaster between Dundee and Wormit (Scotland) 
During  a  violent  storm  on  the  evening  of  28  December  1879,  the  centre  section  of  the  bridge,  
known  as  the  "High  Girders",  collapsed,  taking  with  it  a  train  that  was  running  on  its  single  
track.  All  seventy-­‐five  people  on  the  train  were  killed.  
Year	   1879	  
Type	   Rail	  (Continuous	  girder	  bridge,	  wrought	  iron	  framework	  on	  cast	  iron	  columns,	  railway	  bridge)	  
Country	   United	  Kingdom	  (Scottland)	  
Cause	   Design	  
Details	   Overturning	  piers	  
Fatalities	   75	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000	  
http://en.wikipedia.org	  
Many  faults  in  design,  materials,  and  processes  that  had  contributed  to  the  failure.  
Bouch  had  been  advised  that  calculating  wind  loads  was  unnecessary  for  girders  shorter  than  
200   feet   (61  m),   and   had   not   followed   this   up   for   his   new  design  with   longer   girders.   The  
section  in  the  middle  of  the  bridge,  where  the  rail  ran  inside  high  girders  (through  trusses),  
rather  than  on  top  of  lower  ones  (deck  trusses),  to  allow  a  sea  lane  below  high  enough  for  the  
masts   of   ships,   was   potentially   top   heavy   and   very   vulnerable   to   high   winds.   The   piers  
consisted  of  four  castiron  columns  15in.  In  diameter,  and  two  columns  18in  in  diameter,  in  the  
form   of   cylinders,   allo   ne   and   a   half   inches   in   thickness,   and   filled   with   portland   cement  
concrete.  These  seven  pieces  were  put  together  by  horizontal  and  diagonal  braces.The  wind  
pressure  requie  to  overturn  the  structure,  with  a  train  on  it  was  not  over  the  50lbs  per  sq.  ft.  
The  piers  being  light  lacce  the  weight  to  resist  overturning.  
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2-span truss bridge near Fish's Eddy, New York 
Year	   1886	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Derailed	  train	  impact	  on	  bridge	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000	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Bridge over Wabash River crossing Toledo St. Louis and 
Kansas City Railway, Bluffton(Indiana),1886 
Year	   1886	  
Type	   Rail	  (combination	  of	  wood	  and	  steel)	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Center	  pier	  washed	  out	  
Fatalities	   2	  
Injuries	   2	  
Collapse	   Total	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
Truss bridge near Ducannon, (Pennsylvania) 
Year	   1886	  
Type	   Rail	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Center	  pier	  washed	  out	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   6	  
Collapse	   Total	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
This   was   an   old   iron   Pratt   truss   bridge   previously   been   strengthened   by   castiron   arches.  
Afterwards   a   pier  was   built   under   the   center   of   the   span   and   the   arch   removed.   A   freshet  
washed  out  this  pier  and  when  the  freight  train  cross  the  river  it  failed.     
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Iron bridge in Hilton, (North Carolina) 
Year	   1886	  
Type	   Rail	  and	  car	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   A	  dereiled	  car	  strinked	  the	  end	  post	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   Partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
Pratt truss on the New York Ontario and Western railway 
Year	   1886	  
Type	   Rail	  and	  car	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Truss	  knocked	  down	  by	  dereiled	  cars	  
Fatalities	   4	  
Injuries	   several	  
Collapse	   Partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	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Iron Whipple truss over Petewawa River, Pembrook (Ontario)  
Year	   1886	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Steam	  sholvel	  too	  high	  struck	  the	  portal	  
Fatalities	   2	  
Injuries	   20	  
Collapse	   Partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
  
A   through   iron  whipple   truss  on   the  Canadian  Pacific  Rail-­‐way  was  knocked  down;  a  steam  
shovel  was  too  high  and  in  going  through  struck  the  portal,  causing  the  end  post  to  raise  and  
wreck  the  bridge  
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Bridge near Louisville, Nashville (Alabama River) 
 
Year	   1887	  
Type	   Rail	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Debris	  in	  water)	  
Details	   Wood	  in	  water	  destroys	  bridge	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Period	   before	  1900	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Bussey bridge near Forest Hill (Boston) 
Year	   1887	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Design	  error/poor	  construction	  
Details	   Error	  in	  design	  and	  construction	  
Fatalities	   26	  
Injuries	   115	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Period	   before	  1900	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
  
This  is  one  of  the  most  disastrous  failure  that  has  evere  been  in  terms  of  life  lost  and  injuried.  
The   bridge   was   104ft   span,   built   on   a   skew,   over   a   highway.   A   morning   commuter   train,  
inbound   to   Boston,   was   passing   over   the   "Bussey   Bridge",   a   Howe   truss,   at   South   Street  
collapsed,   sending   several   cars   crashing   to   the   street   below.   Twenty-­‐four   commuters  were  
killed  and  another  125  were  seriously   injured.  The  breaking  of  an  iron  hanger,   that  support  
the  floor  beams  to  the  upper  chord  of  the  deck  truss,  due  to  the  propagation  of  an  old  crack.    
The   design   was   very   poor   design   because   the   load   acts   to   one   side   of   the   resisting   force,  
producing  bending  moment  instead  of  pure  traction.  The  breacking  of  the  hanger  is  caused  by  
a  locomotive  that  support  an  engine.  
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Small wooden bridge in North Chatsworth, Illinois 
Year	   1887	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Bridge	  caught	  fire	  after	  weeds	  had	  been	  burnt	  along	  the	  track	  earlier.	  A	  six	  coach	  Niagara	  Falls	  
Special	  train	  unable	  to	  stop	  in	  time.	  
Fatalities	   82	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Period	   before	  1900	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Big Otter River, Northfolk and western Railway (Virginia), 
1887 
Year	   1887	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Bridge	  caught	  fire	  after	  weeds	  had	  been	  burnt	  along	  the	  track	  earlier.	  A	  six	  coach	  Niagara	  Falls	  
Special	  train	  unable	  to	  stop	  in	  time.	  
Fatalities	   82	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Period	   before	  1900	  
Continent	   North	  America	  
References	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
The  bridge  was  a  timber  Howe  truss.  Later  the  timber  truss  was  replaced  by  a  Fink  truss  of  
iron,  The  third  span  was  completed  with  the  exception  of  the  sway  bracing,  where  in  place  of  
this,   diagonal   wooden   planks   had   been   inserted.   In   this   condition   several   train   passed   the  
bridge,  and  the  heavy  coal  train  caused  the  failure.  
The  failure  might  have  been  caused  by  the  breaking  of  I  bars,  as  two  were  found  in  the  wrecks  
showing   old   fractures   in  welds,   that  might   have   been   due   to   the   stresses   caused   by   lateral  
deflection.  
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Staunton Bridge, Virginia 
Year	   1887	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Weakening	  of	  steel	  member	  by	  overheating	  (as	  timber	  bridge	  is	  replaced	  by	  steel	  bridge)	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
La Salle bridge, New York, 1889 
Year	   1989	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   total	  
Phase	   In	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering.	  
A  derailed  car  “swelling”  out  against  the  100’  Pratt  truss  that  was  good  designed;  It  fell  while  a  
freight  train  was  passing  over  it.     
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St. George, Ontario, 1889 
 
Year	   1989	  
Type	   Car	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Poor	  constrction	  details	  
Fatalities	   13	  
Injuries	   29	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   In	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering.	  
  
This  was  a  eight  span  of  50’bridge  of  lattice  girders.  The  girder  was  designed  properly  and  all  
the  requirements  are  respected;  the  weak  part  was  the  floor  of  the  bridge,  consisting  in  8’’  by  
12’’   ties   spaced   10’’apart   and   resisting   directly   upon   the   girders.   There   were   no   rerailing  
device  along  the  end  of   the   tie,   so   that   just  before   the  bridge  was  reached  one  of   the  driver  
tires  broke  and  rolled  off  to  one  side  of  the  road.  If  the  rerailing  devices  had  been  used  on  the  
bridge  and  the  floor  system  had  been  well  designed,  no  serious  results  would  have  occurred.  
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Bridge crossing the Knoxville Cumberland Gap and Luissville 
Railway over Flat Creek, 1889 
 
Year	   1989	  
Type	   Car	  (wood	  bridge)	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact/	  Dereilment	  
Fatalities	   10	  
Injuries	   19	  
Collapse	   total	  
Phase	   In	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering.	  
  
There  was  a  derailment  at  about  200’  from  the  trestle;  the  derailed  car  kept  on  the  road  bed  
until   the  trestle  was  reached,  breaking  a  beam  ends;   this  beam  encountered  the  ends  of   the  
loose  ties  of  the  trestle,  carrying  them  forward  and  bunching  them  together.  The  bunching  left  
a  gap  in  the  deck  that  create  a  truck  accident.  
The   accident   could   have   been   be   averted   had   rerailing   device   been   used   and   had   the   floor  
been  strong.  The  floor  was  very  poor,  the  ties  being  spaced  4’  apart.  
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The Pekin Peoria and Union Bridge, over the Illinois River 
(Illinois), 1890 
Year	   1890	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Not	  found	  
Details	   Failure	  under	  86	  tons	  engine	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering.	  
San Bernardino Bridge, California, 1890 
Year	   1890	  
Type	   Rail/	  300’	  suspension	  bridge	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Material	  strength	  
Details	   8	  teams	  of	  mules	  and	  two	  wagons	  for	  an	  amount	  of	  120	  lbd	  (designed	  for	  1500	  lbs	  per	  linear	  ft)	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   During	  tests	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering.	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Bridge in Chicago 
Year	   1892	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Ship	  Impact	  
Details	   A	  steamer	  hit	  the	  bridge/	  error	  of	  ship	  captain	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
 
 
Figure 9  
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Covington Bridge 
Year	   1892	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  (probably)	  
Details	   Cable	  failure	  
Fatalities	   26	  
Injuries	   12	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   construction	  
Period	   before	  1900	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
  
That  was  a  highway  bridge  with  several  short  span,  with  the  longest  one  of  300’,  which  failed  
under  construction.  The  false-­‐work  are  strong  enough  and  the  construction  procedures  were  
the  same  of  many  other  works  with  the  same  type  of  methodology.  
The  most   probable   cause  was   the   poor   construction   phase   design   to   take   into   account   the  
settlement  of  the  false-­‐work  that  were  supported  on  soft  soil.  
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Denville, Illinois 
Year	   1893	  
Type	   Rail	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Freight	  train	  broke	  in	  two;	  the	  bridge	  was	  shoved	  forward	  allowing	  the	  rear	  endto	  drop	  off	  its	  pier	  
Fatalities	  -­‐	  
Injuries	   -­‐	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   In	  phase	  
Chester truss bridge 
Year	   1893	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Train	  enters	  bridge	  on	  which	  some	  load-­‐bearing	  elements	  were	  removed	  
Fatalities	  17	  
Injuries	   32	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   Construction/repair	  
The  wrecked  bridge  was  two  110’.  The  bridge  was  undergoing  repairs,  consisted  of  putting  on  
more  cover  plates  to  the  top  chords,  to  meet  the  demands  of  an  increase  of  weight  of  rolling  
stock.  They  put  new  elements  to  carry  the   load,  but  since  the  old  members  are  carrying  the  
dead   loads,   the   new   plates   cannot   be   worked   up   to   their   available   strength   without  
overloading  the  old  part.  The  way  to  obtain  equal  stress  is  to  jack  up  the  truss  so  as  to  relieve  
the  dead  load  in  the  members  being  strengthened.     
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  57	  
	  
Louisville truss bridge 
Year	   1893	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Parts	  of	  scaffolding	  removed	  before	  bracing	  of	  bridge	  put	  in	  place,	  strong	  winds	  
Fatalities	   22	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Period	   before	  1900	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
The  bridge  is  two  338’  spans,  three  546.5’  spans  and  one  208’  span;  thirty-­‐seven  individuals  
died  during  its  construction.  The  first  twelve  died  while  working  on  a  pier  foundation  when  a  
caisson   that   was   supposed   to   hold   back   the   river   water   flooded,   drowning   the   workers.  
Another  four  men  died  a  few  months  after  that  when  a  wooden  beam  broke  while  working  on  
a  different  pier  caisson.    
The  Big  Four  Bridge  had  one  of  the  biggest  bridge  disasters  in  the  United  States,  occurring  on  
December  15,  1893  when  a  construction  crane  was  dislodged  by  a  severe  wind,  causing  the  
false-­‐work  support  of  a  truss  to  be  damaged  and  the  truss—with  forty-­‐one  workers  on  it—fell  
into  the  Ohio  River.  Twenty  of  the  workers  survived,  but  twenty-­‐one  died.  Hours  later,  a  span  
next  to  the  damaged  span  also  fell  into  the  river,  but  was  abandoned  at  the  time,  causing  no  
injuries.  The  failure  was  caused  by  the  wind  that  overturn  the  traveler,  putting  all  the  weight  
in   the   crane   corner.   The   contractor   stated   that   the   wind   picked   up   the   truss   bodily   and  
dropped  it   into  the  river.  However   it  seems  improbable  considering  that   the  truss  weighted  
only  2M  lb  and  the  wind  was  30m/h.  So  it  was  developed  that  not  all  the  lateral  bracing  ware  
in  place,  and  probably  it  accounts  for  the  failure.  
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Two span of a street railway bridge in Saginaw, Michigan 
Year	   1894	  
Type	   Street	  Railway	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Wind	  Storm	  +	  poor	  construction	  design	  
Details	   Not	  enough	  stiffened	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   Construction	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
  
The  bridge  was  two  span;  one  was  a  combination  of  Warren  truss  of  160’  span,  and  the  other  
a  swing  bridge  combination  Howe  truss  of  160’  span.  The  failure  of  the  first  span  was  due  to  
the  weakness  of  the  structure,  the  wind  and  lateral  bracing  failing  first  and  allowing  the  
trusses  to  fall  sideway.  The  bridge  was  constructed  in  a  different  way  respect  to  the  one  that  
the  engineer  thought,  substituting  the  iron  with  the  wood  
and  without  designing  calculation  on  it.  
  
The  pressure  due  to  overturning  effect  of  the  wind  caused  
the  turn  table  to  fail,  allowing  the  bridge  to  slip  off  sideway.  
In  other  parts  the  rived  were  spaced  too  far  in  the  end  post  
that  the  cover  plates  are  bulged  up  between  the  rivets.    
 
Figure 12     
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Bedford Bridge, Ohio 
Year	   1896	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Limited	  knowledge	  
Details	   Not	  enough	  stiffened	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
  
Figure 13  
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Bridge at Point Ellic, Victoria (British Columbia) 
Year	   1896	  
Type	   Road/	  combination	  of	  wood	  and	  steel	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Limited	  knowledge	  
Details	   Not	  enough	  stiffened	  
Fatalities	   70	  
Injuries	   200	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
  
The  bridge  was  120’  deck  span  of  Pratt  combination  trusses,  two  120’  deck  span  of  Whipple  
combination  trusses,  and  short  trestle  approach  and  it  was  designed  first  to  have  a  wagon  
bridge  but  then  it  was  changed  during  the  buildup  extending  the  gauge,  using  flat  strap  rails  
and  spiking  them  to  the  floor  planks,  no  extra  stringers  being  used.  
In  order  to  develop  the  bending  moment  on  the  floor  beams  the  track  was  laid  on  one  side,  
but  this  increase  the  shear  on  that  side  and  so  weakened  the  floor  beams.  
After  an  accident,  the  old  floor  was  substitute  but  some  of  them  were  kept  in  place;  it  was  a  
failure  of  one  of  these  floor  beams  that  caused  the  wreck.  It  sheared  off  close  up  to  the  end  
where  the  wood  had  decayed.  
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Birningam Bridge over the Canhaba River, Alabama 
Year	   1896	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Loosening	  or	  removal	  of	  a	  rail	  by	  train	  wrekers	  
Fatalities	   -­‐	  
Injuries	   -­‐	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  University	  of	  Wisconsin-­‐-­‐Madison.	  College	  of	  Engineering	  
SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
It  was  a  bridge  with  several  short  span  from  30’  to  60’  and  the  central  one  of  150’.  The  central  
span,  two  of  sixty  and  one  of  thirty  feet  failed.  The  wreck  have  been  caused  by  the  loosening  
or  removal  of  a  rail  by  train  wreckers.  
Bridge near Spartanburg, South Carolina 
Year	   1897	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Derailed	  train	  impact	  on	  bridge	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000	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Viaduct in Pottsville, Pennsylvania 
Year	   1897	  
Type	   Viaduct	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Pour	  design	  
Details	   Failure	  of	  one	  of	  the	  abutments	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000	  
  
The  wing-­‐walls,  built  against  the  side  of  a  bluffer  were  not  heavy  enough  to  resist  the  swelling  
action  of  the  wet  bank  
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Bridge over the St. Lawrence River near Cornwall, by the 
Ontario-New York Railway 
Year	   1898	  
Type	   Viaduct	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Pour	  design	  
Details	   Failure	  of	  one	  of	  the	  abutments	  
Fatalities	   15	  
Injuries	   16	  
Collapse	   Construction	  
Phase	   Not	  in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000	  
  
It  was  erected  as  a  cantilever  bridge  in  one  span,  and  in  the  other  two  as  a  composite  bridge  of  
Pratt  truss  span  of  368’  each.  The  two  further  span  were  already  completed  and  the  one  next  
to  the  shore  practically  completed  where  a  worker  tearing  down  the  false-­‐work  and  the  two  
span  fell.  
The  conclusion  were  that  the  pier  must  have  fallen  frst,  but  the  suddenness  of  the  failure  led  
many   to   believe   other-­‐wise,   as   masonry   always   gives   warnings   before   failure.   But   it   is  
possible  that  the  piers  was  undermined  and  so  it  might  topped  over  suddenly.  
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Porter's Draw timber railroad bridge, north of Pueblo, 
Colorado 
 
Year	   1904	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   30	  feet	  of	  floodwater	  that	  swept	  through	  the	  normally	  dry	  channel,	  washing	  out	  the	  county	  
bridge.	  The	  bridge	  floated	  downstream	  and	  severely	  damaged	  the	  wooden	  railroad	  bridge.	  Train	  
caused	  weakened	  bridge	  to	  collapse	  
Fatalities	   97	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~53~2321126,00.html	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3 arches Auburn bridge, California 
Year	   1911	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Scaffolding	  collapses	  under	  weight	  of	  fresh	  concrete	  
Fatalities	   3	  
Injuries	   16	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
 
 
Figure 14  
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Glen Loch bridge, Pennsylvania 
Year	   1912	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Limited	  knowledge	  
Details	   Fatigue	  
Fatalities	   4	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Coos-Bay-bridge Oregon 
Year	   1924	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact	  underside	  of	  deck	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Ohio Falls truss bridge 
Year	   1927	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Insufficient	  bracing	  of	  intermediate	  scaffolding	  (cantilevered	  construction)	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000	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Poughkeepsie suspension bridge 
Year	   1927	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Quality	  of	  ground	  much	  worse	  than	  expected	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
 
Figure 16  
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4-span beam and slab bridge (Anacostia River) 
Year	   1933	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Scour,	  lacking	  inspection	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
Steel truss bridge near Manassas, Virginia 
Year	   1937	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Truck	  impact	  on	  compression	  strut	  of	  the	  truss	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Truss bridge near Pagosa Springs in Colorado 
Year	   1937	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   High	  concentration	  of	  vehicles	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
Whiteson Bridge near Minnville, Oregon (North Yamhill 
River) 
Year	   1937	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Height	  of	  truck	  bigger	  than	  maximum	  headroom	  of	  portal	  frame	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Bridge near the Niagara Falls (Niagara River) 
Year	   1938	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Debris	  in	  water)	  
Details	   Ice-­‐induced	  pressure	  on	  arch	  abutments	  leads	  to	  collapse	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  




Figure 17  
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Figure 19      Figure 20 
  
Battered   and   twisted,   its   steel   girders   tangled   grotesquely,   the   shimmering   Falls   View  
"honeymoon"   bridge   linking   the   United   States   and   Canada   across   the   Niagara   river,   today  
emerged   the   victor   in   a   dramatic   battle   with   a   huge   ice   jam   which,   as   the   directed   by   an  
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unseen  hand,   sought   inexorably   to  destroy   the   graceful   span.  A   sharp  drop   in   temperature,  
tumbling  the  mercury  to  eight  above  zero,  coupled  with  the  ceaseless  toil  of  hastily  recruited  
workers,   relieved   pressure   of   the   100-­‐foot   ice   pack   at   the   foundations   of   the   bridge   this  
morning.  Triumphant  but  weary,  owners  of  the  structure  declared  that  danger  of  collapse  had  
passed,   at   least   temporarily.   Toiling   under   floodlights   thruout[sic]   the   night,   laborers   with  
picks   and   shovels  dug   a  60-­‐foot  ditch   around  abutments   on   the  American   side.  When   clear  
water  was   reached  wooden  bulwarks  were  placed  against   the  sorely   torn  girders.  Receding  
temperatures  checked  the  flow  of   ice  over  the  fall  and  indications  were  that  the   lower  river  
current  was  gradually  carrying  away  much  ice  from  under  the  jam.  The  tremendous  force  of  
the  floes  have  pushed  piles  of   ice  100  feet  high  up  under  the  bridge.   Iron  girders  were  bent  
and  twisted   like  wire.  The  deck  of   the  bridge  reared  ten   feet   in   the  air  yesterday  afternoon.  
The  main  lower  arch  girder  of  the  bridge  seems  bent  and  twisted  beyond  hope  of  repair.  The  
deck  of  the  bridge  sagged  several  feet  from  the  American  side.  The  base  of  support  on  this  side  
seems  moved  about  7  feet  from  its  original  resting  place.  The  Falls  View  bridge  is  one  of  three  
structures  spanning  the  gorge  near  the  falls.  
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Tacoma Narrows suspension bridge 
Year	   1940	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Limited	  knowledge	  
Details	   Insufficient	  bending-­‐	  and	  torsion	  stiffness,	  aerodynamic	  instability	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Continent	   North	  America	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
LEVY,	  M.,	  SALVADORI,	  M.,	  Why	  Buildings	  Fall	  Down,	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  New	  York,	  2002.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  




 Figure 21 
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  77	  
	  
Length of center span 2800 ft 
Width 39 ft 
Depth of stiffening girders 8 ft 
Start of construction Nov, 23, 1938 
Opened for traffic July, 1, 1940 
Collapse of bridge Nov, 7, 1940 
 Figure 22 
The   first  Tacoma  Narrows  Bridge  opened   to   traffic  on   July  1,  1940.   Its  main  span  collapsed  
into  the  Tacoma  Narrows  four  months  later  on  November  7,  1940,  at  11:00  AM  (Pacific  time)  
due  to  a  physical  phenomenon  known  asaeroelastic  flutter  caused  by  a  67  kilometres  per  hour  
(42  mph)  wind.  The  bridge  collapse  had   lasting  effects  on  science  and  engineering.   In  many  
undergraduate   physics   texts   the   event   is   presented   as   an   example   of   elementary   forced  
resonance  with  the  wind  providing  an  external  periodic   frequency  that  matched  the  natural  
structural   frequency   (even   though   the   real   cause   of   the   bridge's   failure   was   aeroelastic  
flutter[1]).   Its   failure  also  boosted  research   in   the   field  of  bridge  aerodynamics/aeroelastics  
which  have  themselves  influenced  the  designs  of  all  the  world's  great  long-­‐span  bridges  built  
since  1940.  
WHY  CODES  DON’T  COVER  EXCEPTIONAL  LARGE  SCALE  BRIDGES?  
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Plate girder Gerber hinge bridge near New York 
Year	   1939	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact	  of	  ship	  with	  loose	  anchor	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
2-span truss bridge over Mississippi in Chester, Illinois 
Year	   1944	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Uplifting	  wind	  load	  not	  considered	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
SMITH,	  D.W.,	  Bridge	  failures,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Institution	  of	  Civil	  Engineers,	  Part	  1,	  Vol.	  60,	  
1976,	  pp.	  367-­‐382.	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Swing bridge in Boston-Charlestown, Massachusetts 
Year	   1945	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact	  in	  half-­‐open	  swing	  bridge	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
John Grace-Memorial Bridge (Cooper River), South Carolina 
Year	   1946	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  forced	  by	  wind	  into	  bridge	  deck	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Bridge near Fresno, California (King's Slough River) 
Year	   1947	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   Agriculture	  vehicle	  train	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000	  
Rockport-Bridge, Maine (Goose River) 
Year	   1947	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Truck	  impact	  on	  truss	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Hinton truss bridge, West Virginia	  
Year	   1949	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Insufficient	  capacity	  of	  cantilever	  arm	  during	  construct	  
3ion	  phase	  
Fatalities	   5	  
Injuries	   4	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
Elbow Grade Bridge, Willamette National Forest, timber truss 
Year	   1950	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Parts	  of	  truss	  underdesigned	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Sullivan Square motorway bridge, Boston 
Year	   1952	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Instability	  of	  scaffolding	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
Eric bridge, Cleveland, Ohio 
Year	   1956	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Wind)	  
Details	   Winds	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  HARIK,	  I.E.,	  SHAABAN,	  A.M.,	  GESUND,	  H.,	  VALLIS,	  G.Y.S.,	  WANG,	  S.T.,	  United	  States	  Bridge	  
Failures,	  1951-­‐1988,	  Journal	  of	  Performance	  of	  Constructed	  Facilities,	  Vol.	  4,	  No.	  4,	  1990.	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Interstate 29 West Bridge, Sioux City, Iowa 
Year	   1962	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Scour	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.e-­‐commatrix.com/PBB/dnb-­‐copy.html	  
Lake Pontchartrain bridge (Lake Pont) 
Year	   1964	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  error	  of	  ship	  captain	  
Fatalities	   6	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
SMITH,	  D.W.,	  Bridge	  failures,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Institution	  of	  Civil	  Engineers,	  Part	  1,	  Vol.	  60,	  
1976,	  pp.	  367-­‐382.	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Bridge near Charleston, South Carolina (Cooper River)	  
Year	   1965	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Scour,	  pier	  failure	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   no	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Silver bridge, chain suspension bridge (Ohio River) 
Year	   1967	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Limited	  knowledge	  
Details	   Fatigue	  
Fatalities	   46	  
Injuries	   9	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
http://www.englib.cornell.edu/ice/lists/historytechnology/successfailures.html	  
http://www.iti.nwu.edu/links/bridges/disasters.html	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Figures 24-25-26-27  
A   lot   of   people   have   already   heard   about   the   Silver   Bridge   and   how   it   collapsed   in  
mysterious.   The   Silver   Bridge  made   the   intersection   of  Main   and   Sixth   streets   one   of   the  
busiest  in  Point  Pleasant.  
The   bridge   was   dubbed   the   ‘Silver   Bridge‘   because   it   was   the   country’s   first   aluminum  
painted  bridge.  It  was  constructed  in  1928  and  consisted  of  a  700  foot  center  span  and  380  
foot  side  spans.  It  was  of  suspension  design  with  “eye  bars”  chained  and  linked  together  with  
massive  pins,   instead  of  the  conventional  wire  cables.  Then  Silver  bridge  was  the  first  eye-­‐
bar  suspension  bridge  of  its  type  to  be  constructed  in  the  United  States.  
On  December  15,1967  at  approximately  5  p.m.,  the  U.S.  Highway  35  bridge  connecting  Point  
Pleasant,   West   Virginia   and   Kanauga,   Ohio   suddenly   collapsed   into   the   Ohio   River.   The  
structure  only   took  about  1  minute   to   completely   fall   into   the   river  below.  Dozens  of   cars  
and  trucks  followed  the  structure  into  the  river,  claiming  46  lives  and  9  injuring.  
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Bridge in Illinois (Kaslaski River) 
Year	   1970	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Not	  anchored	  against	  uplift	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
Buckman Bridge near Jacksonville, Florida 
Year	   1970	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Limited	  knowledge	  
Details	   Voided	  pier	  fills	  with	  sea	  water	  during	  construction,	  anaerobic	  bacteria	  produce	  methan	  gas	  -­‐-­‐>	  
expansion	  of	  pier	  -­‐-­‐>	  partial	  collapse	  of	  bridge	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Continent	  North	  America	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Chesapeake Bay Bridge, Annapolis 
Year	   1970	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Military	  ship	  gets	  out	  of	  control	  and	  hits	  the	  bridge	  during	  one	  hour	  and	  stormy	  weather,	  5	  
spans	  collapse,	  11	  other	  spans	  damaged	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
 
Motorway bridge, Junction Antelope Valley 
Year	   1971	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Earthquake)	  
Details	   Earthquake	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	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Motorway bridge near Pasadena, California (Arroyo Seco 
River) 
Year	   1972	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Scaffolding	  collapses	  under	  weight	  of	  fresh	  concrete	  
Fatalities	   6	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
SMITH,	  D.W.,	  Bridge	  failures,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Institution	  of	  Civil	  Engineers,	  Part	  1,	  Vol.	  60,	  
1976,	  pp.	  367-­‐382.	  
 
Chesapeake Bay Bridge, Annapolis 
Year	   1970	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Military	  ship	  gets	  out	  of	  control	  and	  hits	  the	  bridge	  during	  one	  hour	  and	  stormy	  weather,	  5	  
spans	  collapse,	  11	  other	  spans	  damaged	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	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Sidney-Lanier Bridge Brunswick, Georgia 
Year	   1972	  
Type	   Road	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  misunderstanding	  captain	  -­‐	  staff	  
Fatalities	   10	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
SMITH,	  D.W.,	  Bridge	  failures,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Institution	  of	  Civil	  Engineers,	  Part	  1,	  Vol.	  60,	  
1976,	  pp.	  367-­‐382.	  
  
The  ship  noticed  that  it  was  heading  into  the  bridge  so  the  ship  dropped  its  anchor,  but  the  
anchor   failed   to   holdWhen   the   ship   hit   the   bridge,   it   knocked   several   spans   apart.   Ten   to  
fifteen  automobiles  fell  into  the  water  when  the  spans  fell  apart  
  
Figure 28       Figure 29 
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Lake Pontchartrain bridge (Lake Pont) 
Year	   1974	  
Type	   Road	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  captain	  slept	  
Fatalities	   3	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
SMITH,	  D.W.,	  Bridge	  failures,	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Institution	  of	  Civil	  Engineers,	  Part	  1,	  Vol.	  60,	  
1976,	  pp.	  367-­‐382.	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3-span bridge in Lafayette Street, St-Paul, Minnesota 
Year	   1975	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Limited	  knowledge	  
Details	   Brittle	  failure	  of	  new	  steel	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   no	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	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21-span, Pass Manchac Bridge, Louisiana 
Year	   1976	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  error	  of	  ship	  captain	  
Fatalities	   2	  
Injuries	   2	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
 
Figure 31  
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Fulton Yates Bridge near Henderson, Kentucky 
Year	   1976	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   Overloading	  during	  refurbishment	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.e-­‐commatrix.com/PBB/dnb-­‐copy.html	  
Benjamin Harrison Memorial Bridge near Hopewell, Virginia 
Year	   1977	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  failure	  in	  electronic	  of	  ship	  guidance	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	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Bridge over Passiac River, Union Avenue 
Year	   1977	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  2	  spans	  collapse	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
 
Interstate 17 Bridge, Black Canyon, Arizona 
Year	   1978	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Flood	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.e-­‐commatrix.com/PBB/dnb-­‐copy.html	  
  
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  96	  
	  
Southern Pacific Railroad Bridge (Berwick Bay), Louisiana 
Year	   1978	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  steel	  truss	  of	  70	  m	  falls	  into	  water	  and	  sinks	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
 
K&I Railroad Bridge, Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky 
Year	   1979	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   Vehicle	  exceeding	  weight	  limit	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.e-­‐commatrix.com/PBB/dnb-­‐copy.html	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Alabama Rail Bridge, Alabama 
Year	   1979	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Train	  impact	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.e-­‐commatrix.com/PBB/dnb-­‐copy.html	  
Southern Rail Bridge, Indiana 
Year	   1979	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   Vehicle	  exceeding	  weight	  limit	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.e-­‐commatrix.com/PBB/dnb-­‐copy.html	  
  
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  98	  
	  
Bridge over the Hood canal, Washington 
Year	   1979	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Wind)	  
Details	   Wind	  and	  storm	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
 
Interstate 10 Bridge, Phoenix, Arizona 
Year	   1979	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Flood	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.e-­‐commatrix.com/PBB/dnb-­‐copy.html	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Concrete 5-span box girder bridge near Rockford 
Year	   1979	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Big	  cracks,	  failure	  of	  Epoxy-­‐filled	  joint	  (not	  enough	  hardened	  to	  take	  shear	  force)	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   no	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Sunshine Skyway Bridge near St.Petersburg, Florida 
Year	   1980	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  not	  enough	  care	  of	  captain	  in	  bad	  weather	  
Fatalities	   35	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  






Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  




Opening  of   the  newer  span  was  delayed  until  1971   for   reinforcing  of   the  south  main  pier,  
which  had  cracked  due  to  insufficient  supporting  pile  depth.  The  second  span  was  used  for  
all  southbound  traffic,  while  the  original  span  was  converted  to  carry  northbound  traffic.  
The  southbound  span  (opened  in  1971)  of  the  original  bridge  was  destroyed  at  7:33  a.m.  on  
May  9,  1980,  when  the  freighter  MV  Summit  Venture  collided  with  a  pier  (support  column)  
during  a  storm,  sending  over  1200  feet  (366m)  of  the  bridge  plummeting  into  Tampa  Bay.  
The  collision  caused  six  automobiles  and  a  Greyhound  bus  to  fall  150  feet  (46  m),  killing  35  
people.  
Ironically,   the   south   main   pier   (the   one   that   required   reinforcement   before   completion)  
withstood  the  ship  strike  without  significant  damage.  It  was  the  second  pier  to  the  south  of  it  
that  was  destroyed,  a  secondary  pier  that  was  not  designed  to  withstand  a  large  ship  strike.  
 Figure 35  
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Truss bridge in Trenton, Wisconsin (Milwaukee River) 
Year	   1980	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Truck	  impact	  on	  main	  truss	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   1	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Multiple span box girder bridge in East Chicago, Indianapolis 
Year	   1982	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Scaffolding	  collapses	  under	  weight	  of	  fresh	  concrete	  
Fatalities	   13	  
Injuries	   18	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	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Before   the  construction  of   the  expressway,  portions  of  Truck  Route  912  were  on  Kennedy  
Avenue.  5.7  miles  (9.2  km)  of  new  expressway   from  the  Toll  Road  to  Chicago  Avenue  was  
constructed.   On   April   15,   1982,   fourteen  workers  were   killed   and   eighteen   injured  when  
falsework  beneath  a  ramp  failed  during  a  concrete  pour.  
  
OSHA   discovered   several   errors   that   caused   the   collapse   of   the   bridge   section.   The  most  
likely   cause   of   the   collapse   was   "the   cracking   of   a   concrete   pad   supporting   a   leg   of   the  
shoring  towers."  The  failure  of  the  concrete  pad,  built  too  thin,  led  to  another  finding;  1  inch  
bolts   that   were   supposed   to   connect   key   stringers   to   cross-­‐beams   instead  were   replaced  
with   frictional   clips,   but   investigators   did  not   find   any  documentation   that   supported   this  
substitution.  Investigators  could  not  locate  any  engineering  calculations  supporting  the  pads  
as  designed;  worse,  the  pads  were  built  substandard  to  the  undocumented  design.  
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Prestressed concrete precast box girder bridge, Saginaw 
Year	   1982	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Too	  weak	  temporary	  support	  elements	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
Syracuse bridge, New York 
Year	   1982	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Torsional	  buckling	  due	  to	  lacking	  lateral	  support	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   5	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	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Connecticut Turnpike Bridge near Greenwich (Mianus River) 
Year	   1983	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Deterioration	  
Details	   Corrosion	  of	  joint	  hangers	  (Gerber-­‐joint),	  constraint	  stresses	  due	  to	  big	  skewness	  
Fatalities	   3	  
Injuries	   3	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
LEVY,	  M.,	  SALVADORI,	  M.,	  Why	  Buildings	  Fall	  Down,	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  New	  York,	  2002.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
http://www.englib.cornell.edu/ice/lists/historytechnology/successfailures.html	  
http://www.iti.nwu.edu/links/bridges/disasters.html	  
MENZIES,	  J.B.,	  Bridge	  Safety	  Targets,	  Report	  for	  the	  Highways	  Agency,	  Ref	  :	  HA5021C,	  1996.	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The  Mianus  River  Bridge  carries  Interstate  95  over  the  Mianus  River  in  the  Cos  Cob  section  
of  Greenwich,  Connecticut.  The  bridge  had  a  100-­‐foot  section  of   its  deck  of   its  northbound  
span  collapse  on  June  28,  1983.  Three  people  were  killed  when  their  vehicles   fell  with  the  
bridge   into   the   Mianus   River   70   feet   below,   and   three   were   seriously   injured.   Casualties  
from  the  collapse  were  few  because  the  disaster  occurred  at  1:30  a.m.,  when  traffic  was  low  
on  the  often  crowded  highway.  
The  collapse  was  caused  by  the  failure  of  two  pin  and  hanger  assemblies  that  held  the  deck  
in  place  on  the  outer  side  of  the  bridge.  The  hanger  on  the  inside  part  of  the  expansion  joint  
at  the  southeast  corner  was  forced  from  the  pin  that  was  holding  it,  and  the  load  was  shifted  
to   the   only   other   pin   in   the   joint.   The   problem  was   caused   by   rust   formation  within   the  
bearing   on   the   pin,   exerting   a   tremendous   force   on   the   hanger.   The   extra   load   on   the  
remaining   pin   started   a   fatigue   crack   at   a   sharp   corner   on   the   pin.   When   it   failed  
catastrophically,  the  deck  was  supported  at  just  three  corners.  When  two  heavy  trucks  and  a  
car  entered  the  section,  the  remaining  expansion  joint  failed,  and  the  deck  crashed  into  the  
river  below.  
The  ensuing  investigation  cited  corrosion  from  water  buildup  due  to  inadequate  drainage  as  
a   cause.   During   road   mending   some   10   years   before,   the   highway   drains   had   been  
deliberately   blocked   and   the   crew   failed   to   unblock   them   when   the   road   work   was  
completed.   Rainwater   leaked   down   through   the   pin   bearings,   causing   them   to   rust.   The  
outer  bearings  were  fracture-­‐critical  and  non-­‐redundant,  a  design  flaw  of  this  particular  type  
of  structure.  The  bearings  were  difficult  to  inspect  close-­‐up,  although  traces  of  rust  could  be  
seen  near  the  affected  bearings.  
The  incident  was  also  blamed  on  inadequate  inspection  resources  in  the  state  of  Connecticut.  
At   the   time   of   the   disaster,   the   state   had   just   12   engineers,  working   in   pairs,   assigned   to  
inspect   3,425   bridges.   The   collapse   came   despite   the   nationwide   inspection   procedures  
brought  about  by  the  collapse  of  the  Silver  Bridge  in  West  Virginia  in  December  1967.     
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Walnut street viaduct over Interstate 20 in Denver, Colorado 
Year	   1985	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Failure	  of	  pier	  head	  sending	  eight	  55-­‐ton	  bridge	  girders	  onto	  road	  underneath	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   4	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~53~2151748,00.html	  
Walnut   Street  Viaduct  over   I-­‐25   in  Denver,   under   construction,   collapsed  during   the  early  
morning  hours  of  Oct.  4,  1985,  killing  one  construction  worker  and  injuring  four  others.  The  
new  viaduct  was  being  built  to  replace  the  old  Larimer  Street  Viaduct.  
The  Mousetrap,  so  dubbed  by  a  radio  reporter  in  the  1960s,  is  the  intersection  of  I-­‐25  and  I-­‐
70   northwest   of   downtown  Denver   .   It  was   so   called   because   it   supposedly   looked   like   a  
mousetrap   from   the   air,   and   because   it   was   infamous   for   trapping   vehicles   within   its  
network  of  sharply  curving  ramps.  
In  the  early-­‐morning  hours  of  August  1,  1984,  a  truck  carrying  a   load  of  torpedoes  on  I-­‐25  
exited  onto  one  of  the  offramps  and,  apparently  traveling  and  too  high  a  speed,  dumped  the  
load   under   the   various   Mousetrap   structures.   The   freeway   was   closed   for   miles   in   all  
directions   for   several  hours.  This  prove   the   indedequacy   to  handle   the  estimated  300,000  
vehicles  daily.  
In  1964,  the  portion  of  newly-­‐designated  (1957)  I-­‐70  from  Colorado  Boulevard  west  to  I-­‐25  
was  opened  on  an  elevated  structure  above  46  th  Ave.  A  modified   interchange  at   I-­‐25  was  
built   (this   interchange   had   previously   served   46   th   Ave.   ).   One   year   later,   in   1965,   the  
portion  of  I-­‐70  going  west  from  I-­‐25  was  opened.  This  portion  was  aligned  with  48  th  Ave.  
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Following   the   “Torpedoes   in   the   Mousetrap”   incident   in   1984,   plans   were   made   to  




Bridge in El Paso, Texas 
Year	   1987	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Inadequate	  scaffolding	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   7	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	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Schoharie Creek Bridge (New York) 
Year	   1987	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Flooding	  and	  storm	  lead	  to	  collapse	  of	  two	  spans	  after	  scouring	  of	  a	  pier	  
Fatalities	   10	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
LEVY,	  M.,	  SALVADORI,	  M.,	  Why	  Buildings	  Fall	  Down,	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  New	  York,	  2002.	  
BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
http://www.iti.nwu.edu/links/bridges/disasters.html	  
The  Schoharie  Creek  Bridge  was  a  New  York  State  Thruway  bridge  over  the  Schoharie  Creek  
near   Fort   Hunter,   in   New   York   State.   On   April   5,   1987   it   collapsed   due   to   erosion   at   the  
foundations  after  a  record  rainfall.  The  collapse  killed  ten  people.  
The   final   design   for   the   bridge   was   approved   in   January   1952   by   the   New   York   State  
Department  of  Transportation,  (previously  named  The  New  York  State  Department  of  Public  
Works).  The  design  described  509  ft  crossing  consisting  of  five  simply  supported  spans  with  
nominal  lengths  of  100  ft,  110  ft,  120  ft,  110  ft,  and  100  ft.  The  bridge  was  supported  with  
pier   frames   along  with   abutments   at   each   end.   The   pier   frames  were   constructed   of   two  
slightly   tapered   columns  with   tie  beams.  The   columns  were   fixed   in  place  within   a   lightly  
reinforced  plinth  positioned  on  a  shallow,  reinforced  spread  footing.  The  spread  footing  was  
to  be  protected  with  a  dry  layer  of  riprap.  
The  superstructure  consisted  of  two  longitudinal  main  girders  with  transverse  floor  beams.  
The  skeleton  of  the  bridge  deck,  7.9  in  thick,  was  made  up  of  steel  stringers.     
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Motorway bridge near Seattle 
Year	   1988	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Girders	  not	  yet	  tied	  together	  by	  diaphragms,	  Domino	  effect	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
 
Box girder bridge in Los Angeles 
Year	   1989	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Collapse	  when	  scaffolding	  was	  removed	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   5	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	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Bridge in Baltimore 
Year	   1989	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Prestressing	  not	  in	  place,	  asymmetric	  loading	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   14	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
	  
	  
Figure 38  
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Cypress Freeway, Oakland, California 
Year	   1989	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Earthquake)	  
Details	   Loma	  Prieta	  earthquake	  
Fatalities	   42	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	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Figure 40 
The  Cypress  Street  Viaduct,  often  referred  to  as  the  Cypress  Structure,  was  a  1.6  mile  long,  
raised  two-­‐tier,  multi-­‐lane  (four  lanes  per  deck)  freeway  constructed  of  reinforced  concrete  
that  was  originally  part  of  the  Nimitz  Freeway  (State  Highway  17,  and  later,  Interstate  880)  
in  Oakland,  California.  
It  replaced  an  earlier  single-­‐deck  viaduct  constructed  in  the  1930s  as  one  of  the  approaches  
to  the  San  Francisco–Oakland  Bay  Bridge.  
It   officially   opened   to   traffic   on   June   11,   1957   and   was   in   use   until   the   Loma   Prieta  
Earthquake  occurred  on  October  17,  1989,  when  much  of  the  upper  tier  collapsed  onto  the  
lower  tier  resulting  in  42  fatalities.  
The  double-­‐decked  viaduct  was  initially  designed  in  1949  by  the  City  of  Oakland  as  a  way  to  
ease   traffic   on   local   streets   leading   to   the   Bay   Bridge,   such   as   Cypress   Street   (which  was  
California  State  Route  17  at  the  time).  
On  October  17,  1989,  the  portion  of  the  structure  from  16th  Street  north  all  the  way  to  the  
MacArthur  Maze  collapsed  during  the  Loma  Prieta  Earthquake,  due  to  ground  saturation  and  
structural  flaws.  When  it  was  in  use,  the  upper  tier  was  used  by  southbound  traffic,  and  the  
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lower  tier  was  used  by  northbound  traffic.  Some  sections  of  the  Cypress  Street  Viaduct  were  
largely   supported  by   two   columns   on   either   side,   but   some   sections  were   only   supported  
beneath  by   a   single   supporting   column.  The  design  was  unable   to   survive   the   earthquake  
because  the  upper  portions  of  the  exterior  columns  were  not  tied  by  reinforcing  to  the  lower  
columns,  and  the  columns  were  not  sufficiently  ringed  to  prevent  bursting.  At  the  time  of  its  
design,   such   structures  were   not   analyzed   as   a  whole,   and   it   appears   that   large   structure  
motion   contributed   to   the   collapse.   It  was   built   on   filled   land,  which   is   highly   susceptible  
to  soil  liquefaction  during  an  earthquake  and  exhibits  larger  ground  motion.  
After   the   earth   stopped   moving,   local   residents   and   workers   began   crawling   into   and  
climbing  upon  the  shattered  structure  with  the  goal  of  rescuing  those  left  alive.  Many  were  
saved;  some  only  by  amputation  of  trapped  limbs.[2]  The  collapse  of  the  upper  tier  onto  the  
lower  tier  resulted  in  42  fatalities—two-­‐thirds  of  the  total  quake  death  toll  of  63[3].  
The  viaduct  was  torn  down,  Cypress  Street  was  renamed  (now  known  as  Mandela  Parkway,  
in   honor   of  Nelson   Mandela)   with   a   landscaped   median   planted   where   the   viaduct   once  
stood.   Before   reconstruction   occurred,   the   viaduct   ended   at   the   Eighth   Street   exit   on   the  
southern  end,  with  the  two  roadways  going  over  Seventh  Street,  while  the  southbound  exit  
off  the  MacArthur  Maze  onto  Cypress  Street  at  32nd  Street  remained  open  to  local  traffic  on  
the  northern  end.  
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Section of East span of San Francisco Oakland Bay Bridge, 
California 
Year	   1989	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Earthquake)	  
Details	   Loma	  Prieta	  earthquake	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
http://www.iti.nwu.edu/links/bridges/disasters.html	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Truss bridge in Shepherdsville, Kentucky 
Year	   1989	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Litter	  collector	  is	  higher	  than	  bridge	  clearance	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
MENZIES,	  J.B.,	  Bridge	  Safety	  Targets,	  Report	  for	  the	  Highways	  Agency,	  Ref	  :	  HA5021C,	  1996.	  
Herbert C. Bonner Bridge, North Carolina 
Year	   1990	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact,	  4	  piers	  damaged,	  5	  spans	  collapse	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	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Motorwaybridge, jonction Antelope Valley 
Year	   1992	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Earthquake)	  
Details	   One	  span	  collapses	  during	  earthquake	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	  
566,	  Union	  suisse	  des	  professionnels	  de	  la	  route	  (VSS),	  Zurich,	  2002.	  
Truss bridge in Concord, New Hampshire 
Year	   1993	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Stiffener	  mounted	  mounted	  at	  wrong	  place	  
Fatalities	   2	  
Injuries	   7	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000	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Truss bridge near Mobile CSXT Big Bayou Canot, Alabama 
Year	   1993	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  impact	  
Fatalities	   47	  
Injuries	   103	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
  
The  1993  Big  Bayou  Canot  train  wreck  was  the  derailing  of  an  Amtrak  train  on  the  CSXT  Big  
Bayou   Canot   bridge   in   northeast  Mobile,   Alabama,  USA,   killing   47   and   injuring   103,   on  
September   22,1993.   It   is   the   deadliest   train   wreck   in   the   history   of   the   United   States  
passenger  railroad  company  Amtrak.    
The   collision   forced   the   bridge   approximately   three   feet   out   of   alignment   and   severely  
kinked   the   track.   The   bridge   span   had   actually   been   designed   to   rotate   so   it   could   be  
converted   to   a  swing   bridge  by   adding   suitable   equipment.   No   such   conversion   had   ever  
been   performed,   but   the   span   had   not   been   adequately   secured   against   unintended  
movement.  
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Interstate 5 Bridge in Los Angeles, California 
Year	   1994	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Earthquake)	  
Details	   Earthquake	  measuring	  6.6	  on	  the	  Richter	  scale	  
Fatalities	   57	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  24	  die	  as	  quake	  strikes	  LA,	  The	  Guardian,	  18	  January	  1994,	  p.11+24.	  
 
Figure 43      Figure 44 
  
January  17,  1994,  Northridge  earthquake,  which  caused  57  deaths  and  widespread  damages.     
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3-span 3-girder composite bridge near Clifton (Tennessee River) 
Year	   1995	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Executed	  construction	  sequence	  different	  from	  planned	  one	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   construction	  
References	  SCHEER,	  J.,	  Versagen	  von	  Bauwerken,	  Band	  1:	  Brücken,	  Ernst	  &	  Sohn,	  Berlin,	  2000.	  
http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	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Twin bridges, Interstate 5 (Arroyo Pasajero River), Coalinga, 
California 
Year	   1995	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Scour	  of	  bridge	  foundations	  
Fatalities	   7	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  BAILEY	  et	  al.,	  Niveau	  de	  sécurité	  requis	  pour	  l'evaluation	  des	  ponts-­‐routes	  existants,	  Report	  Nr.	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Bridge near Covington, Tennessee (Hatchie River) 
Year	   1999	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard/Change	  in	  structural	  enviroment	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Scouring	  and	  undermining	  of	  the	  foundations	  
Fatalities	   8	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  LEVY,	  M.,	  SALVADORI,	  M.,	  Why	  Buildings	  Fall	  Down,	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  New	  York,	  2002.	  
MENZIES,	  J.B.,	  Bridge	  Safety	  Targets,	  Report	  for	  the	  Highways	  Agency,	  Ref	  :	  HA5021C,	  1996.	  
85-­‐foot  section  of  the  bridge  fell  into  the  rain-­‐swollen  Hatchie  River  due  to  the  rushing  water  
that   had  weakened  bridge   supports.   Four  passenger   cars   and   a   tractor-­‐trailer   rig  plunged  
into  the  river,  killing  all  occupants.  Eight  people  were  killed.  
A  federal  investigation  found  that  the  river  channel  had  moved  83  feet  since  the  bridge  was  
built  in  1936,  and  that  the  bridge  likely  failed  as  a  result  of  the  deterioration  of  timber  piles  
that  were  originally  buried  and  not  designed  to  be  in  water.  
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Bridge over motorway in Concord (North Carolina) 
Year	   2000	  
Type	   Foot/pedestrian	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   Bridge	  snapped	  in	  half	  as	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  left	  a	  motor	  speedway	  event	  on	  Saturday	  
evening	  and	  were	  crossing	  over	  it	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   107	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
References	  http://www.basedn.freeserve.co.uk/bridge.htm	  
http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
CEDERQUIST	  S.	  C.	  ,	  Motor	  speedway	  bridge	  collapse	  caused	  by	  corrosion,	  Materials	  
Performance,	  Vol.	  39,	  No.	  7,	  2000,	  pp.	  18-­‐19	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Queen Isabella Causeway, Texas 
Year	   2001	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Four	  barges	  and	  a	  tugboat	  struck	  the	  bridge	  
Fatalities	   8	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2009472.stm	  
Four  loaded  barges  crashed  into  one  of  the  support  columns  traveling  at  2/10ths  of  1  mile  
per  hour.  Three  80-­‐foot  sections  of  the  bridge  fell  into  the  water,  leaving  a  large  gap  in  the  
roadway.  The  collapsed  sections  were  just  next  to  the  highest  point  of  the  causeway,  making  
it  difficult  for  approaching  drivers  to  notice.  Eight  people  were  killed  as  their  cars  fell  85  feet  
into  the  water.  Five  vehicles  were  recovered  from  the  water  along  with  three  survivors.  
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Historic Tewksbury Township pony truss bridge, Hunterdon 
County, New Jersey 
Year	   2001	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   30-­‐ton	  tractor-­‐trailer	  ignored	  signs	  warning	  of	  the	  bridge's	  8-­‐ton	  weight	  limit.	  Truck	  struck	  the	  
bridge	  abutment	  and	  caused	  it	  to	  collapse.	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.nj.com/news/expresstimes/nj/index.ssf?/base/news-­‐5/1091264704141461.xml	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Interstate 40 Bridge, Oklahoma (Webber Falls) 
Year	   2002	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Ship	  collides	  with	  one	  of	  piers,	  bridge	  collapses	  on	  length	  of	  150	  m	  
Fatalities	   14	  
Injuries	   4	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php	  
  
A   barge   collided   with   the   Interstate   40   Bridge   near  Webbers   Falls,   Oklahoma,   collapsing  
multiple  spans  and  killing  14  people.  
Figure 48       Figure 49 
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Marcy bridge (Utica-Rome Expressway project) 
Year	   2002	  
Type	   Foot	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Global	  torsional	  buckling,	  bridge	  not	  braced	  properly	  as	  workers	  built	  it.	  The	  braces	  could	  not	  
hold	  the	  long,	  narrow	  bridge	  as	  workers	  poured	  the	  concrete	  deck	  onto	  it.	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   9	  
Collapse	   complete	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 Figure 51 
  
Collapse   of   the   Marcy   Pedestrian   Bridge   during   the   construction   phase   due   to   Lateral-­‐
Torsional-­‐Buckling  (LTB)  during  the  deck  concreting  phase,  which  killed  a  worker.  
The  responsibility  was  first  to  the  designer  that  designed  the  girder  and  its  bracing  without  
taking  into  account  the  global  torsional  buckilng  (un  conservative  choice).  
Since  the  bridge  is  classified  as  a  single  box  girder,  the  designed  girder  was  excluded  from  
the  governing  code  subsection  10.51,  which  provides  specifications   for  two  or  more  single  
cell  composite  box  girders.  Only  in  this  subsection  the  buckling  phenomena  were  mentioned,  
although  the  global  torsional  buckling  was  not  considered.  Moreover  the  codes  address  the  
topic  of  bracing  only  with  regards  to  bridges  which  have  been  already  erected  and  bracers  
are  specified  to  support  flanges  that  will  never  be  made  composite.  Consequently,  since  the  
considered  bridge  collapsed  during  the  execution  and  is  a  composite  structure  these  codes  
can’t  be  considered  valid  for  it.  
Though  diaphragms  can’t  be  considered  as  bracing  systems  if  not  anchored,  this  distinction  
is  not  clearly  expressed  in  the  NYCDOT  code,  where  diaphragms  are  called  bracing.  
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1900 built Kinzua Viaduct (north-central Pennsylvania), steel 
bridge 
Year	   2003	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Wind)	  
Details	   A	  tornado,	  with	  estimated	  speeds	  exceeding	  140	  km/h,	  produced	  a	  complex	  pattern	  of	  high-­‐
velocity	  winds	  that	  attacked	  the	  viaduct	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	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Imola Avenue Bridge, Napa, California 
Year	   2003	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Three	  100-­‐ton	  hydraulic	  jacks	  used	  to	  raise	  the	  project's	  falsework,	  constructed	  to	  support	  the	  
poured-­‐in-­‐place	  concrete	  bridge	  deck,	  were	  placed	  up	  to	  2	  inches	  off-­‐center,	  predisposing	  them	  
to	  shifting	  under	  the	  weight	  they	  supported.	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   7	  
Collapse	   partial	  




 Figure 56 
OSHA's  investigation  uncovered  evidence  that  the  three  100-­‐ton  hydraulic  jacks  used  to  raise  
the   bridge   construction's   falsework   were   placed   up   to   two   inches   off   center,   predisposing  
them  to  shifting  under  the  weight  they  supported.   	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Interstate 95 Bridge in Bridgeport, Connecticut 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Human	  error	  
Details	   Car	  collided	  with	  a	  36'000	  l	  home	  heating	  oil	  tanker.	  After	  the	  ignition,	  fuel	  oil	  that	  had	  dropped	  
through	  a	  drain	  onto	  a	  local	  road,	  also	  began	  to	  burn,	  partially	  melting	  steel	  girders	  holding	  up	  I-­‐
95.	  The	  road	  dropped	  1.2	  m	  before	  firefighters	  stabilised	  the	  steel's	  temperature	  with	  water.	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-­‐
usmain273725186mar27,0,2627324.story	  
 Figure 57  
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West Grove Bridge in Silver Lake, Kansas 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Rail	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Impact	  
Details	   Bridge	  collapsed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  derailment	  of	  forty	  of	  the	  coal	  train's	  137	  cars	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  




Crews  worked  Monday  to  pull  40  cars  from  a  train  transporting  coal  that  derailed  into  a  creek  
and  caused  a  bridge  to  collapse.	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Interstate 20 Bridge near Pecos, Texas (Salt Draw River) 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Normally	  dry	  river	  swollen	  with	  floodwaters	  from	  two	  days	  of	  heavy	  rain	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	   http://www.kxan.com/Global/story.asp?S=1761274&nav=0s3dM2gG	  
  
A   storm   system   passed   through  
the   southwest   U.S.   and   western  
Texas   from   April   3-­‐6,   2004,  
resulting   in   multiple   waves   and  
heavy  rainfall  over  west  Texas  and  
southeast  New  Mexico.  The  heavy  
rainfall   led   to   significant   flash  
flooding   in   small   rivers   there   are  
not   supposed   to   have.   Flood  
waters   rushed   out   of   the   Davis  
Mountains   through   Salt   Draw  
towards  the  Pecos  River  resulting  
in  the  collapse  of  an  Interstate-­‐20  
bridge  ten  miles  west  of  Pecos                        Figure 58   
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Lee Roy Selmon Expressway, Tampa Bay, Florida 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Sinkhole	  developed	  under	  a	  concrete	  pier	  causing	  the	  bridge	  to	  drop	  4.5	  m,	  and	  the	  elevated	  
roadway	  being	  built	  on	  top	  of	  it	  sagged,	  causing	  the	  bridge	  to	  buckle	  and	  collapse.	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	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Bridge near Pawnee City, Nebraska 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   Failure	  of	  falsework,	  bridge	  collapsed	  during	  concrete	  pouring	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   3	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  http://www.beatricedailysun.com/articles/2004/04/23/news/news1.txt	  
 
The  south  end  of   the  bridge  was  poured  and  
fresh   concrete  was   poured   for   an   amount   of  
110  yards,  pumped  in  the  middle  span  of  the  
bridge  at  the  time  of  the  accident,  when  it  was    
planned   of   190   yards   of   concrete   for   all   the  
bridge.  
Probably   the   falsework   design,   that   it   is   the  
responsibility  of  the  contractor  on  a  bridge  of  
this  size,  is  the  cause  of  the  failure.  
 
 
Figure 60     
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Shannon Hills Drive Bridge, Arkansas 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   Road	  crews	  were	  using	  a	  crane	  to	  add	  a	  pedestrian	  crossing	  on	  the	  bridge.	  When	  they	  finished,	  
they	  drove	  the	  crane	  across	  the	  bridge;	  it	  collapsed	  from	  the	  weight	  from	  the	  crane.	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.katv.com/news/stories/0404/141620.html	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Interstate 70 Bridge in Denver, Colorado 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  error	  
Details	   A	  40-­‐ton	  girder	  was	  temporarily	  braced	  to	  the	  existing	  bridge	  with	  five	  metal	  bars	  spaced	  along	  
the	  30	  m	  length.	  The	  bracings,	  fastened	  to	  the	  bridge	  with	  bolts,	  came	  loose	  as	  the	  girder	  
collapsed.	  Girder	  fell	  on	  vehicle	  on	  road	  underneath.	  
Fatalities	   3	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   construction	  
Reference	  http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~53~2151748,00.html	  
  
in   1964,   when   Interstate   70   through   Denver  
was  completed,  the  structure  was  designed  to  
last  30  years.  As  a  result,  considering  also  that  
the  system  was  payed  with  federal  dollars,  the  
highways   were   designed   to   meet   only   the  
minimum   standard   necessary   for   the  
projected   traffic   load   to   avoid   having   the  





Figure 61  
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Interstate 10 Bridge, Escambia Bay, Florida 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Hurricane)	  
Details	   Hurricane	  Yvan	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	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 Figure 64-65 
  
Hurricane  Ivan  struck  Pensacola,  Florida  on  September  16,  2004,  with  wind  velocity  of  120-­‐
mile-­‐per-­‐hour,  causing  severely  damages  like  in  the  2.5  mile  I-­‐10  bridge  over  Escambia  Bay.  
The  hurricane’s  damage  resulted  in  over  3,400  feet  of  the  bridge  that  drops  into  the  bay.  
Hurricane  Ivan  destroyed  over  24  pile  bridge  bents.   
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McCormick County bridge east of Mount Carmel (Little 
River), South Carolina 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Debris	  in	  water)	  
Details	   Debris	  from	  the	  remnants	  of	  Hurricane	  Jeanne	  stacked	  against	  the	  bridge's	  support	  piles	  in	  the	  6	  
m-­‐deep	  water	  and	  led	  to	  its	  collapse	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	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Bridge northwest of Norcatur (Sappa Creek), Kansas 
 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Overloading	  
Details	   Heavy	  grain	  trucks	  over	  the	  bridge	  weakened	  its	  supports	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   2	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.mccookgazette.com/story/1079462.html	  
  
Deputy  Barry  Richards  told  Herald  reporters  that  officers  assume  that  heavy  grain  trucks  over  
the  bridge  weakened  its  supports.  
The  57-­‐foot  timber  bridge  was  rated  to  carry  six  tons  on  two  axles,  and  a  maximum  of  13  tons  
on  five  axles.     
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  145	  
	  
Rural bridge near Shelby, North Carolina (Beaver Dam creek) 
 
Year	   2004	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Natural	  hazard	  (Flooding)	  
Details	   Bridge	  washed	  out.	  Drivers	  were	  unaware	  the	  bridge	  was	  washed	  out	  and	  they	  basically	  drove	  
one	  after	  another	  into	  the	  swollen	  river.	  
Fatalities	   1	  
Injuries	   2	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://mobile.newsobserver.com/front/v-­‐pda/story/1917686p-­‐8264097c.html	  
  
The  collapse  leaves  one  man  dead  and  injured  two  other  people  into  the  icy  waters  of  Beaver  
Dam  Creek.  
Forensics  haven’t  said  yet  what  caused  the  bridges  collapse.  A  few  months  before  the  collapse,  
workers   had   removed   debris   that   collected   under   one   part   of   the   bridge.   The   day   of   the  
collapse  a  flood  washed  away  the  bridge  and  drivers  drove  in  the  river.     
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Laurel Mall Pedestrian Bridge between the parking and 
shopping areas 
Year	   2005	  
Type	   Foot	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Deterioration	  
Details	   The	  bridge	  was	  attached	  by	  large	  metal	  bolts	  and	  brackets,	  which	  had	  corroded.	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   complete	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070102089.html	  
  
The   concrete,   50-­‐foot   long   walkway   in   a   shopping   area   collapse   fortunately   not   during  
business  hours  so  there  were  no  injuries.  
The  bridge,  which  connects  the  second  story  of  the  parking  garage  to  the  stores,  was  attached  
by  large  metal  bolts  and  brackets,  which  had  corroded  by  rust.  
Figure 67     
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  147	  
	  
Lakeview Drive Bridge, Interstate 70 in Washington County 
(Pennsylvania) 
Year	   2005	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Deterioration	  
Details	   Forty-­‐five	  years	  of	  corrosive	  road	  salt	  draining	  onto	  one	  side	  of	  an	  overpass	  and	  a	  history	  of	  
trucks	  hitting	  its	  underside	  likely	  caused	  a	  16	  m-­‐long,	  60-­‐ton	  concrete	  beam	  to	  come	  crashing.	  
Fatalities	   0	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   partial	  
Phase	   in	  service	  
Reference	  http://www.post-­‐gazette.com/pg/05363/629440.stm	  
  
A  guard  rail  and  part  of  concrete  structure  fell  20  to  30  foot  down  of  between  50  and  60  feet  
to   the   road  below.   The   interstate   seems   remain   intact,   even   though   it  was   really   cracked.  
There  were  minor  injuries;  just  one  car  ran  into  the  overpass  once  it  had  failed.  
After  forensic  inspections,  it  was  realized  that  the  bridge  inspections  might  not  show  the  full  
impact  of  rain  and  salt  in  the  corrosion  of  concrete  and  metal  supports  inside  the  beams.  
In  fact  chloride  from  deicing  salt  percolated  through  the  bituminous  asphalt  bridge  surface  
and  penetrated  concrete  beams.    
The  45-­‐year-­‐old  bridge  also  had  sustained  damage  from  oversized  trucks,  so  precise  reasons  
for  its  collapse  still  aren't  clear  and  most  likely  involved  a  combination  of  factors,  including  
design,  weather,  wear  and  tear.  
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Eight-lane, 1,950-feet-long Interstate 35-West Bridge in 
Minneapolis (Mississippi River) 
Year	   2007	  
Type	   Road	  
Country	   United	  States	  
Cause	   Design	  Error	  
Details	   Structural	  fatigue	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  backup	  system	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  failure	  caused	  the	  I-­‐35	  
bridge	  to	  buckle	  during	  the	  evening	  rush	  hour.	  
Fatalities	   12	  
Injuries	   0	  
Collapse	   Partial	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Structural  fatigue,  and  the  lack  of  a  backup  system  in  the  event  of  a  failure,  may  have  been  
factors  in  the  collapse  of  the  Interstate  35-­‐West  bridge  in  Minnesota.  
It   is   not   still   known   exactly  what   caused   the   bridge   to   give  way   in  Minneapolis,   but   state  
reports  from  2001  and  2005  indicated  there  were   fatigue   cracks    in  the  bridge's  trusses,  
and  that  the  bridge  had  no  secondary  system  to  bear  the  weight  of  traffic  in  the  event  of  an  
unexpected  failure.  (no  redundancy)   
The  bridge  "exhibited  several  fatigue  problems,  primarily  due  to  unanticipated  out-­‐of-­‐plane  
distortion  of  the  girders.  Concern  about  fatigue  cracking  in  the  deck  truss  is  heightened  by  a  
lack   of   redundancy   in   the   main   truss   system,''   a   2001   report   by   the   Minnesota  
transportation  department  found.  
"Structural   fatigue   and   fatigue   cracks"   could   have   contributed   to   the   collapse,   Roberto  
Ballarini,   a   structural   engineer   and   head   of   the   civil   engineering   department   at   the  
University  of  Minnesota,  said.  
The  1,900  foot  bridge  is  supported  by  two  arching  superstructures  trusses.  
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The  bridge  had  been  classified  as  "structurally  deficient,"  but  that  determination  meant  only  
that  it  needed  to  be  maintained  and  not  torn  down,  Minnesota  Gov.  Tim  Pawlenty  said  in  a  
press  conference.  
  
AGEING  INFRASTRUCTURE  AND  MAINTENANCE  ISSUES:  
In  the  1950’s  and  60’s,  a  huge  development  in  the  infrastructure  of  America  occurred  when  a  
massive   expansion   of   highways   and   bridges   were   constructed   to   support   the   industrial  
growth  of  the  country.  The  design  of  infrastructure  at  that  time  was  very  heavily  focused  on  
creation   and   lacked   an   emphasis   on   sustainability.   Most   of   these   bridges,   referred   to   as  
“Baby  Boomer  Bridges”,  were  designed  to  last  50  years.  Now  we  are  entering  a  period  where  
the  life  cycles  of  the  baby  boomer  bridges  are  reaching  their  ends  and  substantial  repair  and  
replacement  is  needed.  
At  the  same  time  as  our  bridges  are  aging,  the  expansion  of  the  industry  continues  to  grow,  
increasing  the  loads  on  the  already  taxed  infrastructure.  From  1995  to  2004,  annual  travel  
on   the   Interstate   Highway   System   increased   by   2.8%;   meanwhile,   the   system   was   only  
expanded  by  ½%.  Truck  travel  has  doubled  in  the  past  20  years  and  is  expected  to  double  
again  by  2035.  
Maintenance  and  repair  of  the  existing  bridges  is  required  to  improve  the  current  condition  
of   our   infrastructure.   Construction   of   new   bridges   is   necessary   to   support   the   increasing  
traffic   loads.   Where   will   the   funds   for   this   work   come   from?   In   a   time   of   economic  
uncertainty,  how  can  the  industry  tackle  the  struggles  associated  with  aging  infrastructure?  
AASHTO,  the  American  Association  of  State  Highway  and  Transportation  Officials  addressed  
these  issues  with  an  article  titled,  “Bridging  the  Gap”.  Written  in  response  to  a  rise  in  public  
awareness  of  the  aging  infrastructure  crises  due  to  the  Minneapolis  bridge  failure  in  2007,  
the  article  is  directed  towards  the  public.  It  covers  the  main  points  of  the  issue,  using  facts  
and  data  to  paint  a  picture  the  public  can  understand.  
The  age  of  U.S.  bridges  is  presenting  using  multiple  graphs  and  charts,  emphasizing  the  point  
that  38%  of  all  U.S.  bridges  are  over  40  years  old.  A  similar  presentation  is  used  to  depict  the  
condition  of  the  bridges  across  the  nation,  with  a  total  25.4%  of  bridges  that  are  structurally  
or  functionally  deficient.  Compounded  on  the  aging  and  deteriorating  structures,  the  traffic  
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loads  have  been   increasing  by  2.8%   from  1995   to  2004.     The   impact  of   this   congestion   is  
explained  in  terms  of  delay  caused  by  bottle-­‐necking  at  highway  interchanges.  The  top  ten  
highway  interchanges  experience  1.5  million  truck  hours  of  delay  each  year.  The  cost  of  this  
congestion   amounts   to   $7.8   billion   dollars   a   year,   40%   of   which   is   caused   by   recurring  
congestion.  Adding   to   the  problem,   construction   costs   of   bridge  materials   have   risen  over  
50%   from   2003   to   2008.   The   crises   is   unfolded   as   a   three-­‐part   issue   of   aging   and  
deteriorating   structures,   increased   traffic   loads,   and   sky-­‐rocketing   construction   costs   at   a  
time  of  economic  downturn.  
The  solution  presented  in  this  article  focuses  on  maintaining  bridge  safety  and  planning  for  
the  construction  of  the  new  bridges  required.  AASHTO  calls  for  investment  increases  by  all  
levels  of  government  and  proposed  two  financial  options;  tolls  and  taxes.  The  importance  of  
a   systematic   long-­‐term   maintenance   strategy   is   discussed   with   the   main   goal   to   find   a  
balance   between   fixing   the   immediate   deficit,   preventing   further   deficit   through   efficient  
maintenance,   and   reducing   the   costs   of   new   bridge   construction.   An   essential   part   of   the  
solution  is  research  to  advance  the  design  of  new  bridges  with  an  emphasis  on  sustainability.  
The   article   of   Dan   M.   Frangopol   and   Min   Liu,   published   in   “Structure   and   Infrastructure  
Engineering”  in  March  2007,  “Maintenance  and  management  of  civil  infrastructure  based  on  
condition,   safety,   optimization,   and   life-­‐cycle   cost”   treats   the   problem   of   managing   the  
maintenance   of   civil   engineering   infrastructures  with   respect   to   aging,   using   a   theoretical  
approach.   The   article   focuses   on   the   best   approaches   for  modeling   and   selecting   the   best  
maintenance  plan  for  new  and  existing  structures,  particularly  bridges.  
The   first   objective   of   the   article   is   to   give   a   quantitative   and   qualitative   definition   of   the  
infrastructure  conditions  over  time.  The  performance  indicators  suggested  include:  
• Condition   Index:      the   remaining   load   carrying   capacity   of   a   bridge   is   assessed   by  
visual   inspections   and   a   rating   on   a   previously   defined   scale   is   assigned   to   the  
structure.    
• Safety  Index:    the  ratio  of  the  available  live  load  capacity  to  the  required  capacity.  
• Reliability   Index:   considering   the   probabilistic   nature   of   the   loadings   and   of   the  
resistance  of   the  single  elements   in   the  bridge,   the  probability   that   the   loadings  are  
higher  than  the  resistance  of  the  whole  bridge  is  computed.  
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The   writers   suggest   the   use   of   Genetic   Algorithms   (GA)   to   choose   the   best   management  
practice  to  apply  on  critical  infrastructures.  The  power  of  these  algorithms  is  that  they  can  
optimize   the   management   procedures   when   they   are   subject   to   various   conflicting  
constraint.    
One   of   the   constraints   usually   adopted   in   the   bridge   management   strategies   is   the  
minimization  of  the  Life-­‐cycle  cost.  When  a  structure  is  being  designed,  all  the  future  costs  
should   be   taken   into   account:   initial   construction   costs   are   considered   along   with   future  
operation,   maintenance,   inspection   and   repair   costs   forecasted   on   the   useful   life   of   the  
structure.  The  general  expression  for  the  Life-­‐cycle  cost  is  (Frangopol  et  al.  1997):  
C!" = C! + C!" + C!"# + C!"# + C!  
Where:  
C!"  is  the  total  forecasted  cost  of  the  infrastructure.  
C!  is  the  construction  cost.  
C!"  is  the  expected  maintenance  cost.  
C!"#  is  the  expected  inspections  cost.  
C!  is  the  expected  cost  to  repair  eventual  failures  of  the  infrastructure.  
	  
If  a  Life-­‐cycle  cost  analysis  is  applied  to  an  already  existing  bridge,  then  the  cost  is  defined  
without  the  initial  construction  costs.  
According  to  the  article  there  are  two  ways  to  approach  the  management  of  infrastructure,  
specifically  referring  to  bridges.    The  first  is  a  project  level  approach  in  which  maintenance  is  
planned   while   considering   an   individual   structure   or   a   group   of   similar   structures.      The  
second   is   a   network   level   approach   in   which  maintenance   is   planned   by   considering   the  
impact  of  a  single  failure  of  a  bridge  element  on  the  whole  network  of  transportation.  
According  to  the  first  approach,  Genetic  Algorithms  are  applied  on  a  single  bridge  which  is  
considered   critical   in   the   network   infrastructure,   with   the   goal   of   ranking   a   list   of  
maintenance  actions  with  the  following  goals:  
• Minimize  the  largest  Condition  Index.  
• Maximize  the  smallest  Safety  Index.  
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• Minimize  the  present  value  of  the  life-­‐cycle  costs.	  
The  second  approach  considers  the  whole  network  of  transportation  in  a  particular  area  and  
organizes   management   of   aging   infrastructure   with   the   objective   of   improving   not   the  
performance  of   a   single  bridge  but   the  performance  of   the  whole   transportation  network.  
This   approach   also  uses  Genetic  Algorithms   considering   other   important   indicators   of   the  
performance  of  the  network:  network  reliability  and  cumulative  long-­‐term  costs.  
The  network  reliability  can  be  subdivided  into:	  
• Connectivity   reliability:  measures  the  probability  that  two  nodes  of  the  network  
are  connected  over  a  specific  time  frame.  
• Travel  time  reliability:  measures  the  probability  that  a  trip  between  two  nodes  of  
the  network  can  be  made  in  a  predetermined  time  frame.  
• Capacity   reliability:  measures   the   ability   of   the  network   to  maintain   a   required  
Level  of  service  with  determined  traffic  volumes.  
The  cumulative  long-­‐term  costs  consist  of  two  main  contributors:  
• Operator   costs:   the  equivalent  of  Life-­‐cycle   costs,   including  costs  of  maintenance  
and  repair.  
• User   costs:   a   quantification   of   potential   delays   caused   by   bridge   failures   or  
maintenance.    
Thus,   according   to   the   Network   level   maintenance   planning,   the   goal   is   to   distribute   the  
resources  over  a  number  of  bridges,  giving  the  priority  to  the  ones  which  are  most  critical  to  
network  performance.  This  process  has  the  following  constraints:  
• Minimize  the  cumulative  long-­‐term  costs  over  a  predetermined  analysis  period.  
• Maximize  the  network  reliability  according  to  the  three  indexes  previously  defined.  
	  
The   article   of   Frangopol   and   Liu   addresses   the   problems   of   optimizing   management  
procedures  by  proposing  two  ways  of  facing  the  problem;  at  project  level,  considering  only  
one  bridge  at  a  time,  or  at  a  network  level,  considering  the  whole  transportation  network  in  
the  area  as  a  whole.  It  also  gives  definitions  and  tools  to  quantify  the  variables  which  will  be  
used   in   such   an   analysis.      However,   the   writers   don’t   compare   the   validity   of   the   two  
approaches  by  comparing  them  with  a  real  case.     They  propose  one  numerical  example  for  
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each   of   the   two   approaches   but   they   don’t   show   evidence   of   real   cases   where   these  
processes  were   applied.      In   order   to   validate   the  models   and  procedures   proposed   in   the  
article,  the  two  approaches  should  be  applied  to  a  real  bridge  management  case,  considering  
also   the   possibility   of   integrating   the   two   approaches   in   one   single   way   of   treating   the  
problem  of  best  allocating   the  resources.   In  a  real  case,  both  procedures  would  be  needed  
since  the  funds  should  be  first  allocated  to  the  most  critical  bridges  of  the  network  (using  a  
Network   level   analysis)   and   then   for   each   single   critical   bridge,   a   project   level   analysis  
should  be  carried  on  in  order  to  better  optimize  the  resources  allocated.    The  combination  of  
both  approaches  is  not  considered  in  the  article.  
The   approaches   to   the   problem   of   aging   infrastructure   of   the   two   articles   are   evidently  
different.   The  AASHTO  article   reports   the   current   state   of   the  bridge   infrastructure   in   the  
United  States  and  underlines  the  problems  that  an  aging  infrastructure  can  cause  not  only  to  
the   transportation   system   but   also   to   the   whole   economy.   The   article   reports   the   actual  
values   of   investments  made   by   some   states   over   the   past   years   and   the   estimates   of   the  
needed  funds  to  bring  the  current  bridge  infrastructure  to  acceptable  condition  levels.  The  
article  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  funds  available  to  each  state  are  not  sufficient  to  cover  all  
the   needed   repairs   and   that   a   strategic   optimization   of   the   available   resources   is   needed.  
However,  a  detailed  analysis  on  the  possible  solutions  to  efficiently  revive  and  monitor  the  
aging  of  the  bridge  infrastructure  is  not  provided.    
The  article  of  Frangopol  and  Liu  is  more  focused  on  the  analysis  on  the  problem  of  managing  
an   aging   infrastructure   through   a   rational   and   analytical   approach.   The   article   proposes  
definitions  and  parameters   to  evaluate   the   conditions  of   a   single  element  both  on   its  own  
and   inside   the   infrastructure   network.   Moreover,   it   provides   two   ways   of   proceeding   to  
better   allocate   the   available   resources   on   the   most   critical   points   of   the   infrastructure.    
However,   the   article   does   not   apply   the   procedures   to   real   cases   and   it   doesn’t   take   into  
account  the  possibility  of  unavailable  funds.  
Both   articles   agree  on   the   fact   that   the   current   state   of   the  bridge   infrastructure   is   below  
acceptable  standards  and  that  there  is  an  urgent  need  of  a  more  rational  and  analytical  way  
of  allocating  the  resources.    
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5.  CONSIDERATIONS  
As  written  and  explained  more   in  details   in   the   first  paragraph,   I   summarize   the  principal  
changes  in  code  due  to  the  principal  bridge  failures  as  follow:  
	  
Takoma narrow bridge (1940) 
Overturning forces 1969 
Aerolsticity 1996 
	  
Missisipi in Chester (1944) 
Excessive uplifting due to wind load 1969 
	  
Silver bridge (1967) 
Fatique 1996 
Fatique limit state 1998 
	  
San Francisco Bay bridge(1989) 
Superstructure supports liking 1996 
Ground liquefaction 1996 
	  
Cypress Freeway, Oackland (1989) 
Link in columns reinforcement 1996 
	  
All	  of	  the	  analyzed	  failures	  bring	  to	  new	  concepts	  and	  design	  philosophy:	  
• From	  ADS	  to	  LRFD	  (1935	  to	  1998)	  from	  a	  deterministic	  to	  a	  probabilistic	  approach	  
− Strength	  
− Serviceability	  
• Reliability	  design	  philosophy	  
− Robustness	  
− Redundancy	  
• Uncertainty	  (material	  and	  structural	  behavior)	  due	  to	  unexpected	  non-­‐linear	  behavior	  and	  a	  sort	  of	  
ignorance	  due	  to	  the	  randomness	  of	  many	  factors	  (1998	  β	  factor)	  
• Earthquake:	  From	  a	  force	  based	  demand,	  to	  a	  displacement	  based	  capacity.	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I  believe  that  a  couple  of  good  question  that  an  engineer  has  to  think  about  before  enter  in  the  
practice  of  structural  design  could  be:  
  
1.   Does  the  increase  in  vehicular  live  load  proposed  by  the  AASHTO  LRFD  specification  lead  to  
stronger   and   stiffer   composite   bridges,   and   decrease   the   likelihood   that   deflections   will  
control  the  design?  
2.   How  do  the  new  distribution  factors,  taken  together  with  the  new  AASHTO  LRFD  loadings  
influence  the  eventual  girder  design  moments  and  shears?  
3.   Is  there  a  type  of  structural  system  that  is  more  suitable  for  the  design  that  can  guarantee  
redundancy  and  strength,  avoiding  most  of  the  uncertainty  problems?  
  
So,   in   this   study   it   is   point   out   that   the   bridge   failures   are   due   to   a  mix   of   causes,   but   the  
principal  one  are  
1. Pour  Maintenance,  Inspection  and  bridge  assessment  
2. Design  error/conceptual  error/  ignorance  
3. Misuse/overload  
4. Pour  construction  
5. Human  error  






Maintenance  and  inspection  are  big  issues,  considering  the  ageing  infrastructure  problem  that  
there  is  in  the  US  as  explained  before  in  the  comparison  of  the  two  articles.  Moreover  big  and  
important   decision   should   be   taken   if   it   is   better   to  maintain   the   bridge   or   to   replace   the  
bridge,  considering  not  only  the  cost  of  the  bridge  itself  but  also  the  impact  of  the  community  
during  a  replacement  of  a  bridge,  that  can  be  very  difficult  in  particular  in  a  very  dense  urban  
area   as  New  York   City.   In   the   codes   the   problem   of   the  maintenance,   in   terms   of   reducing  
cracks  and  considered  in  the  design  point  of  view  from  the  fatigue  tables  and  in  the  detailing  
of   the  principal   connections.  These   tables   are   “new”   in   the   codes   and   the   fatigue  problems,  
and  so  also  the  relative  maintenance  after  few  years  can  be  addressed.  
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  158	  
	  
The  pour  construction  as  well  human  error  is  difficult  to  take  into  account  from  a  design  point  
of  view.  Pour  construction   is  considered   in   the  codes  with  required  construction   inspection  
and  human  error  can  be  addressed  during   the  design  phase,   from  a  practical  point  of  view,  
thinking  about  what  are  the  possible  human  error  and  trying  to  avoid  these.  
The  overload  due  to  inadequate  use  of  the  bridge  is  difficult  to  predict  in  the  design  phase,  but  
if   the   bridge   is   used   with   the   design   load   limits,   I   believe   that   the   actual   loads   are   in  
magnitude  enough.  Moreover   the  use  of   safety   factors   and   conservative  design   can  address  
this  issue;  very  often  the  design  loads  are  too  conservative  from  a  magnitude  point  of  view.  
On   the   other   hand,   what   can   be   improved,   is   not   the   magnitude   of   the   loads   but   their  
application  from  a  dynamic  point  of  view.  Dynamic  load  effect  are  considered  in  the  code  only  
like  a  percentage  of  other  static  loads,  instead  to  perform  more  accurate  analysis.  
The   dynamic   point   of   view   it’s  more   interesting   because   it   is   going   to   delineate   clearly   the  
reasons  of  the  better  general  answer  of  using  a  system  instead  the  other.  The  analysis  of  the  
dynamic  effects  in  the  structure  is  divided,  as  usually  is  done,  between  wind  dynamic  effects,  
seismic.  
Dealing  with  the  dynamic  effect  of  the  wind  there  are  two  different  phenomena  that  should  be  
inquired   separately.   Basically   when   the   wind   impact   a   structure   the   wind   has   a   natural  
frequency  that  could  be  in  the  range  of  the  natural  frequency  of  vibration  of  the  wind.  When  
this   happens   the   structure   shows   an   uncontrolled   displacement   that   most   likely   lead   to  
failure.  Supposing  that  the  wind  natural  frequency  is  in  the  range  of  4-­‐6  second,  this  kind  of  
problem  is  related  more  to  large  span  bridges  that  can  have  this  kind  of  range  in  its  natural  
frequency.  Wind   is   a   complex  phenomena   that   lead   to   several   effect   into   the   structure.   For  
simplicity  its  effects  are  divided  in  different  separate  analysis  even  if  they  occur  all  together.    
The  buffeting   analysis   of   bridge   structures   considers   both,   the   aero-­‐elastic   behavior   of   the  
structures   and   the   wind   loading   correlation.   It   is   well-­‐known   that   the   wind   profile   is  
characterized  by  the  mean  velocity  and  fluctuation  due  to  turbulence.  Generally  the  stochastic  
nature   of   wind   loading   in   the   space   and   time   is   not   accounted   in   the   analysis.   Buffeting  
analysis  is  a  trial  to  simulate  the  fluctuation  of  the  wind  from  the  mean  value  putting  25%  of  
the  wind   load  as  amplitude  of  a  cosine  function  to  represent  these  fluctuations.  Considering  
the  wind  load  parallel  to  the  deck  it  is  possible  to  erase  the  randomness  of  the  wind  into  the  
space.    
Flutter  is  a  potentially  dangerous  vibration.  The  aerodynamic  forces  on  a  bridge,  which  are  in  
nearly  same  natural  mode  of  vibration  of  the  bridge,  cause  periodic  motion.  Flutter  occurs  on  
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bridges   so   that   a   positive   feedback   occurs   between   the   aerodynamic   forces   and   natural  
vibration   of   the   bridge.   In   essence,   the   vibration   movements   of   the   bridge   increase   the  
aerodynamic   load   which   in   turns   cause   further   movement   of   the   bridge.   This   kind   of  
phenomena  occurs   in  both  structures  and   in   term  of  displacement   the  comparison  between  
the   two   structures   affirms   again   what   it   is   said   before   for   buffeting   that   having   a   stiffer  
structure  reduces  the  displacement.  
When  wind  flows  around  a  bridge,  it  would  be  slowed  down  when  in  contact  with  its  surface  
and  forms  boundary  layer.  At  some  location,  this  boundary  layer  tends  to  separate  from  the  
bridge   body   owing   to   excessive   curvature.   This   results   in   the   formation   of   vortex,   which  
revises  the  pressure  distribution  over  the  bridge  surface.    
The  vortex   formed  may  not  be  symmetric  about   the  bridge  body  and  different   lifting   forces  
are  formed  around  the  body.  As  a  result,  the  motion  of  bridge  body  subject  to  these  vortexes  
shall  be   transverse  when  compared  with   the   incoming  wind   flow.   It   is  clear   that   transverse  
forces  not  completely  symmetric  cause  torque  in  the  deck.  This  phenomena  was  shown  in  the  
Takoma  narrow  bridge  looking  to  the  flutter  instability.  As  the  frequency  of  vortex  shedding  
approaches   the   natural   frequencies   of   the   bridges,   resonant   vibrations   often   occur,   the  
amplitude  of  which  depends  on  the  damping  in  the  system  and  the  motion  of  the  wind  relative  
to  the  bridges.  
For  extreme  event  is  the  same.  With  wind  tunnel  test  we  can  perform  very  accurate  analysis  
with   a   relative   low   cost,   where   the   wind   loads   magnitudes   are   taken   from   a   probabilistic  
approach  with   a   certain   return   period   and   so   I   believe   that   this   type   of   analysis   is   enough  
reliable.   On   the   other   hand,   from   analysis   without   wind   tunnel   there   lackness   in   terms   of  
dynamic  loads  and  time  history  (that  on  the  other  hand  are  required  in  other  country  codes,  
for  example  in  the  Canadian),  let’s  think  about  the  buffeting  analysis  and  flutter  instabilit  that  
it  is  not  mentioned  in  all  the  codes  that  I  have  analyzed  before.  
From   the   earthquake   load   I   believe   that   response   spectra   analysis   is   enough   safe.   If   we  
consider   actual   earthquake  and  actual   earthquake  modified   to   get   exactly   the  period  of   the  
structure,  we  get  more  or  less  the  same  results,  with  the  response  spectra  analysis  a  little  bit  
more  conservative.  In  term  of  seismic  analysis   it   is  well-­‐known  that  for   long  span  bridges  is  
not  a  compelling  problem  due  to  the  fact  that  the  natural  frequencies  of  an  earthquake  and  a  
large  span  bridge  are  far  away.  Avoiding  the  dynamic  effect  of  the  resonance,  the  problem  it  
could  be  tough  as  a  static  problem  with  the  external   force  proportional   to  the  weight  of   the  
system  mostly  related  to  the  weight  of  the  deck.  Dealing  with  small  span  bridges  it  should  be  
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taken   into   account   the   dynamic   effect   because   of   the   natural   frequency   of   the   structure   is  
closer  to  the  range  of  earthquake  frequency.  
  
I   believe   that  most   of   the   problems   can   be   solved   by   the   sensibility   and   knowledge   in   the  
engineering   design.   Let’s   think   about   the   impact   in   piers,   avoidable   many   times   with   a  
different   design,   or   the   choice   of   different   structural   system,   not   only   in   terms   of   cost-­‐
effectiveness  but  also  in  terms  of  safety  and  structural  response.  
I  believe  that  one  of  the  most  important  concept  that  can  include  the  solution  of  many  issues  
is  the  redundancy  in  different  design  types.  Let’s  think  about  network  structure,  or  better  arch  
network   structure,   in   terms   of   redundancy,   loss   of   one   cable   and   impact   on   one   cable,   or  
simply  a  replacement  of  one  cable.  
This  concept  of  network  structure  is  further  developed  in  web-­‐net  arch  structure,  where  the  
redundancy   is   so   high   that   is   an   impact   occur   in   one   of   the   “net   cables”   there   is   a   perfect  
redistribution  of  the  loads  like  a  full  plane  section.  
The  study  continue  showing  these  results  and  comparison  for  web-­‐net  arch  and  network  arch  
bridge  with  also  dynamic  loads.  Web-­‐net  bridges  are  those  bridges  that  instead  of  support  the  
deck  by  the  mean  of  a  cables,  they  support  the  deck  with  a  net  composed  by  very  thin  cables  
or   wire   lumped   at   some   point   to   form   the   typical   triangulated   pattern   of   the   web   net.  
Generally   speaking   the   reasons  why   it   is   better   to   use   the  Web-­‐net   instead   of   a   pattern   of  
single  cables  are  many  from  different  points  of  view  such  as  Redundancy,  Seismic,  Longevity  
and   also   phenomena   related   to   the   wind   such   as   Buffeting   and   Flattering   as   it   will   be  
explained  later  on.    
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6.  CONCLUSIONS  
  
I  believe  that  most  of  the  changes  in  codes  are  related  to  a  deep  study  and  deep  understand  of  
the  structural  behavior  instead  to  a  deep  understand  of  what  happened  in  a  failure;  structural  
behavior,  with  the  development  of  knowledge,  with  the  research  on  many  phenomena,  with  
computer   analysis   and  wind   tunnel   test   etc.,   is   deeply  understood  now,   and   failures  due   to  
missing  knowledge  and  analysis  is  very  difficult  to  happen.  
For  the  failures  there  is  not  a  real  interest.  In  my  research  I  have  found  more  changes  related  
to   structural   behavior   and   not   many   changes   in   codes   related   to   structural   failures   or  
practical  problems  that  causes  cost  in  terms  of  lives  and  money.  
Let’s   think   about   the   fire   failure   or   the   animals   accidents.   There   were   not   real   changes   in  
provision  or  specification  related  to  these  issues.  It  is  like  considered  governed  by  fate,  but  we  
really  can  design  against  that.  
Let’s  also  think  about  the  attachment  with  the  superstructure,  or  the  debris  contained  in  a  air  
or  water   flow.  For  the  changes   in  code  there  was  only  a  small  changes  (just  named)   for   the  
superstructure  attachments,  but  for  the  debris,  there  are  not  real  specifications  that  impose  to  
the  designer  to  design  against.  
I  believe  that  this  code  philosophy  is  wrong.  We  don’t  really  think  enough  about  failures  and  
we  are  concentrated  more  on  the  behavior  of  the  structure.  I  believe  that  changes  in  code  due  
to   failures   is   very   important,   in  particular   for   low  experienced  engineer   like  me,  who  don’t  
experienced  all  the  history  of  failure  in  person.  
Engineers   who   work   in   the   field   for   many   years   know   what   were   the   causes   and   try   to  
address   these   problems   from   a   practical   point   of   view   but   I   believe   there   is   not   the   same  
consciousness   in   the   codes.   This   is   a   real   problem   in   particular   for   young   engineers   that  
cannot  find  in  the  codes  the  right  answers  for  practical  problems  or  for  practical   issues  that  
led  few  years  before  to  failures,  condemned  them  to  repeat  it  again.  
Therefore  I  believe  that  there  should  be  a  better  development  related  to  failures  in  the  codes  
and  not  only  an  awareness  from  a  practical  point  of  view.     
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7.  NETWORK  BRIDGES  
The   last   step   of   the   research   is   network   structures   usages   done   in   the   bridge   field.   The  
problem   of   this   part   is   that   this   problematic   is   not   almost   covered   by   the   literature   and  
basically  with  the  exception  of  the  network  bridge,  there  is  no  other  usage.  So  this  part  of  the  
research  instead  of  putting  some  particular  project  that  has  marked  the  history  of  this  kind  of  
structure   as   in   the   rest   of   this  work,   it   switch   toward   possible   unrecorded   usages   of   cable  
networks  to  sustain  suspended  bridges  and  cable  stay  bridges.  
Network	  Arch	  Bridges	  
	  
Reporting   the   definition   given   by   Tent   “Network   arches   are   arch   bridges   with   inclined  
hangers  where  some  hangers  cross  other  hangers  at  least  twice.  In  its  optimal  form  the  tie  is  a  
concrete  slab  with  partial  longitudinal  prestress.    
It  is  best  suited  for  small  spans  between  240  feet  and  500  feet.  This  leads  to  attractive  bridges  
that   do   not   hide   the   landscape   behind   them.  A   network   arch   bridge   is   likely   to   remain   the  
world’s  most  slender  arch  bridge.    
The  transverse  bending  in  the  slab  is  usually  much  bigger  than  the  longitudinal  bending.  Thus  
the  main  purpose  of  the  edge  beam  is  to  accommodate  the  hanger  forces  and  the  longitudinal  
prestressing  cables.  The  partial  prestress  reduces  the  cracks  in  the  tie.    
For   load  cases  that  relax  none  or  only  very   few  hangers,  network  arches  act  very  much   like  
many   trusses   on   top   of   one   another.   They   have   little   bending   in   the   tie   and   the   arches.   To  
avoid  extensive  relaxation  of  hangers,   the  hangers  should  not  be   inclined   too  steeply.  Small  
inclination   of   hangers   will   increase   the   bending   moments   due   to   concentrated   loads.   All  
hangers  should  have   the  same  cross-­‐section  and  nearly   the  same  decisive   load.  Their  upper  
nodes  should  be  placed  equidistantly  along  the  arch.    
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Like  any  tied  arch  the  network  arch  can  be  seen  as  a  beam  with  a  compression  and  a  tension  
zone.  An   increased   rise   in   the  arch  would  give   smaller  axial   forces   in   the   chords  and   lower  
steel  weights.  It  is  mainly  aesthetic  considerations  that  limit  the  rise  of  the  arches.  Most  of  the  
shear  force  is  taken  by  the  vertical  component  of  the  arch  force.  The  most  part  of  the  variation  
in  the  shear  forces  is  taken  by  the  hangers.    
Because   there   is   little   slenderness   between   the   nodal   points   of   the   arch,   and   tension   is  
predominant   in   the   rest   of   the   network   arch,   this   type   of   bridge   makes   good   use   of   high  
strength  steel.  All  members  in  an  optimal  network  arch  efficiently  carry  forces  that  cannot  be  
avoided  in  any  simply  supported  beam.  Network  arches  are  very  stiff.    
Compared   with   conventional   bridges,   the   network   arch,   where   the   tie   is   a   concrete   slab,  
usually   saves  more   than   half   the   steel  weight.   The   details   are   simple   and   highly   repetitive.  
Thus   the   cost   per   tons   is   not   very   high.   The   slender   tie   leads   to   short   ramps   and  makes   it  
simpler  to  attach  roads  at  the  ends  of  the  bridge.    
The   building   of   optimal   network   arches   can   bring   great   savings.   However   steel   firms   are  
usually  not  interested  in  using  very  little  steel.  
From	  the	  cable	  to	  the	  network	  
Starting   from   the   first   possible   arrangement   of   the  network   arch  bridge  with   the   cable   not  
inclined,   it   follows  this  kind  of  bridge  in  which  the  cables  sustain  the  live   load  and  the  dead  
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From  the  pictures  we  can  easily  understand  how  is  the  load  path  in  this  kind  of  structure  and  
why   this   kind   of   structure   is   so  well   balanced   and   stiff.   Almost   all  members   are   loaded   in  
compression  and  tension  and  so  as  this  research  has  pointed  out  yet  is  the  best  way  to  make  
structural  members  works  as  well  as  possible.  Then  as  is  easily  understandable  in  the  second  
picture  part  of  the  load  transferred  in  the  arch  is  mutually  equilibrated  by  itself,  between  two  
following  cables  we  have  a  component  of  load  in  the  arch  that  is  opposed  and  then  they  cancel  
out  reciprocally.  
Putting  the  force  in  the  cable  one  following  the  other  we  have  the  following  arragment  
  
This	  kind	  of	  picture	  describes	  all	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  force	  and	  putting	  them	  in	  following	  triangles	  we	  have	  
an	  equilibrated	  arrangementThe	  second	  step	  is	  to	  incline	  the	  cables	  and	  do	  the	  same	  thing.	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The  load  in  the  cables  is  inclined  because  follows  the  direction  of  the  cable  and  then  putting  
then  it  resultsin  this  kind  of  zig-­‐zag  arrangement  on  the  right  of  the  picture.  
Increasing  the  frequencies  of  the  load  pattern  we  can  arrive  at  this  kind  of  network  and  do  the  
same  analisys  and  solve  it  graphically  as  in  the  other  cases    
The  product  used  in  this  case  to  do  the  net  pattern  is  the  Jacob  Inox  Line  Web  Net.    
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In long narrow bridges, however, the longitudinal bending can become decisive mainly because much of the 
strength of the concrete is needed for taking the variation of the axial force in the tie. Normally a bit of extra 





In long narrow bridges, however, the longitudinal bending can become decisive mainly because much of the 
strength of the concrete is needed for taking the variation of the axial force in the tie. Normally a bit of extra 
longitudinal ribbed reinforcement is all that is needed to put things right. 
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Suspension	  bridge	  has	  a	  very	  similar	  but	  opposed	  way	  on	  function	  of	  the	  network	  arch	  bridge.	  
Basically	  the	  main	  difference	  is	  that	  in	  this	  case	  the	  arch	  is	  in	  tension	  instead	  that	  in	  compression	  but	  the	  
cable	  has	  always	  the	  same	  function	  to	  transfer	  the	  load	  from	  the	  deck	  to	  the	  main	  arch.	  
	  
Starting	  from	  the	  same	  span	  of	  the	  former	  bridge	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  invert	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  arch	  passing	  from	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So	  we	  arrive	  at	  the	  same	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  previous	  bridge:	  a	  deck	  sustained	  by	  straight	  cables	  attached	  
to	  an	  arch.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  case	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  solve	  this	  structure	  with	  the	  help	  of	  graphic	  static	  in	  this	  





From	  the	  cable	  to	  the	  network	  
Following	  the	  same	  procedure	  of	  the	  former	  example	  we	  can	  incline	  the	  cable	  to	  have	  a	  network	  
suspended	  bridge	  based	  on	  the	  bridge	  before	  doubling	  the	  cables.	  The	  system	  can	  still	  be	  solved	  by	  graphic	  
static	  introducing	  the	  first	  step	  to	  have	  a	  Webnet	  Suspended	  Bridge	  
Research_Bridge	  failures/changing	  in	  codes	  
	  
Davide	  Trizzino	  dt2352	   Pagina	  170	  
	  
	  
Starting	  from	  the	  Network	  suspended	  bridge	  and	  increasing	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  cable	  until	  it	  is	  possible	  to	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Web-­‐net	  Bridge	  
Web-­‐net	  bridges	  are	  those	  bridges	  that	  instead	  of	  support	  the	  deck	  by	  the	  mean	  of	  a	  cables,	  they	  support	  
the	  deck	  with	  a	  net	  composed	  by	  very	  thin	  cables	  or	  wire	  lumped	  at	  some	  point	  to	  form	  the	  typical	  
triangulated	  pattern	  of	  the	  web	  net.	  Generally	  speaking	  the	  reasons	  why	  it	  is	  better	  to	  use	  the	  Web-­‐net	  
instead	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  single	  cables	  are	  many	  from	  different	  points	  of	  view	  such	  as	  Redundancy,	  Seismic,	  
Longevity	  and	  also	  phenomena	  related	  to	  the	  wind	  such	  as	  Buffeting	  and	  Flattering	  as	  it	  will	  be	  explained	  
later	  on.	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Produced	  by	  Jakob,	  it	  is	  a	  pliable,	  transparent	  grid	  made	  of	  stainless	  steel	  rope	  from	  Jakob	  Inox	  Line,	  done	  
to	  be	  used	  for	  structural	  porposes	  and	  not.	  
The	  Jakob	  Web-­‐net	  is	  a	  permanent	  protective	  and	  safety	  net	  for	  bridges,	  it	  is	  absolutely	  UV	  and	  water	  
resistant.	  
The	  Jacob	  Web-­‐net	  has	  the	  skin-­‐like	  characteristic	  of	  a	  diaphragm,	  it	  can	  form	  a	  plane	  surface	  or	  in	  other	  
case	  be	  tensioned	  in	  three-­‐dimensional	  forms	  featuring	  tunnel-­‐type,	  cylindrical	  or	  other	  curved	  shapes.	  
Basically	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  think	  at	  the	  Web-­‐net	  as	  a	  fabric	  of	  particular	  reisilience	  and	  flexibility,	  a	  net	  whose	  
strands	  are	  clamped	  parallel	  in	  pairs,	  connected	  and	  reciprocally	  curved	  by	  offset	  thickness.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  
general	  behavior	  of	  the	  Web-­‐net	  can	  be	  explained	  as	  a	  spring	  whose	  stiffness	  depending	  on	  the	  mesh	  that	  
is	  chosen	  and	  the	  thickness	  of	  the	  rope.	  
The	  mesh	  of	  Web-­‐net	  is	  completely	  up	  to	  the	  designer	  in	  term	  of	  both	  length	  of	  the	  wire	  between	  lump	  and	  
angle	  of	  the	  pattern.	  
The	  diameter	  rof	  the	  wire-­‐rope	  in	  the	  market	  is	  from	  1mm	  to	  3	  mm.	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It	  is	  proposed	  his	  kind	  of	  suspending	  structure	  because	  of	  with	  Web-­‐Net	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  catch	  up	  all	  the	  
positive	  properties	  of	  network	  structure	  analyzed	  in	  building	  and	  use	  them	  for	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  suspension	  
system	  for	  any	  type	  of	  bridge.	  The	  flexibility	  of	  this	  product	  that	  can	  be	  arranged	  in	  many	  ways	  with	  
different	  mesh	  and	  different	  shapes	  make	  this	  product	  adapted,	  as	  shown	  before,	  to	  be	  used	  instead	  of	  
cables	  in	  arch	  network	  bridge,	  suspension	  bridge	  and	  cable	  stayed	  bridge.	  	  
	  
So	  this	  final	  part	  of	  the	  research	  is	  basically	  the	  proposal	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  new	  bridge	  and	  challenging	  the	  
Web-­‐net	  bridge	  with	  the	  a	  simple	  network	  arch	  bridge	  and	  suspension	  bridge	  NOTA	  with	  particular	  
attention	  at	  the	  dynamic	  analysis.	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Static	  Analysis	  
From	  a	  static	  point	  of	  view,	  having	  a	  bridge	  with	  cables	  or	  Web-­‐net	  is	  basically	  the	  same.	  The	  weight	  of	  the	  
deck,	  supposed	  to	  be	  constant,	  is	  distributed	  on	  the	  cables	  or	  Web-­‐net	  equally.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  the	  load	  of	  
the	  cable	  is	  much	  greater	  than	  the	  load	  in	  a	  single	  rope	  that	  composes	  the	  net.	  This	  allows	  a	  very	  small	  
diameter	  of	  the	  cables	  of	  the	  net	  in	  the	  range	  of	  few	  mm.	  A	  consequence	  of	  having	  inclined	  cables	  is	  that	  
the	  weight	  of	  the	  deck	  is	  decomposed	  in	  two	  forces	  one	  that	  goes	  into	  the	  cables	  and	  one	  that	  goes	  into	  
the	  deck	  as	  compression.	  Thinking	  about	  compression	  it	  is	  important	  to	  think	  about	  flexural	  buckling.	  In	  this	  
case	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  a	  net	  is	  that	  it	  reduces	  dramatically	  the	  inflection	  length	  having	  very	  close	  
cables	  so	  that	  there	  is	  no	  chance	  to	  have	  buckling	  problem.	  If	  someone	  can	  argue	  that	  in	  network	  arch	  
bridge	  the	  deck	  is	  in	  tension	  and	  so	  the	  compression	  is	  canceled	  out,	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  same	  in	  the	  arch	  
that	  is	  in	  compression	  and	  so	  the	  same	  benefit	  effect	  of	  the	  net	  is	  transferred	  in	  the	  arch.	  In	  Suspension	  
Bridges	  the	  deck	  is	  actually	  in	  compression	  and	  so	  it	  could	  be	  problematic.	  The	  general	  solution	  in	  
suspended	  arch	  is	  to	  stiff	  the	  deck	  with	  lateral	  bracing	  increasing	  also	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  deck	  and	  so	  force	  in	  
the	  cable	  and	  lateral	  area	  exposed	  to	  wind.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  using	  the	  Webnet	  we	  have	  no	  problem	  of	  
buckling	  and	  generally	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  use	  a	  light-­‐weight	  deck	  reducing	  also	  the	  exposure	  to	  the	  wind.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  draw-­‐back	  of	  having	  a	  net	  instead	  of	  single	  cables	  could	  be	  recognized	  in	  the	  static	  effect	  due	  to	  
the	  wind	  impact.	  Basically	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  the	  cables	  with	  a	  net	  pattern	  (even	  if	  the	  diameter	  of	  
the	  ropes	  composed	  the	  net	  are	  smaller	  adding	  all	  the	  rope	  areas	  it	  has	  a	  net	  increase	  of	  20%	  –	  30%	  on	  
cable	  area	  depending	  on	  the	  span)	  there	  is	  an	  increase	  also	  in	  the	  area	  exposed	  to	  the	  wind.	  This	  argument	  
is	  reasonable	  and	  most	  likely	  there	  is	  this	  increase	  in	  the	  static	  load	  due	  to	  the	  wind,	  on	  the	  contrary	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  argue	  that	  firstly	  the	  most	  important	  answer	  of	  the	  structure	  against	  the	  wind	  is	  the	  dynamic	  
effect,	  in	  particular	  resonance,	  secondly	  the	  net	  area	  increase	  can	  be	  cancel	  out	  by	  the	  usage	  of	  a	  
lightweight	  deck	  without	  box	  or	  bracing	  that	  is	  just	  allowed	  by	  the	  usage	  of	  a	  net.	  	  
Dynamic	  Analysis	  
The	  dynamic	  point	  of	  view	  it’s	  more	  interesting	  because	  it	  is	  going	  to	  delineate	  clearly	  the	  reasons	  of	  the	  
better	  general	  answer	  of	  using	  a	  net	  instead	  of	  single	  cables.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  dynamic	  effects	  in	  the	  
structure	  is	  divided,	  as	  usually	  is	  done,	  between	  wind	  dynamic	  effects,	  seismic.	  
Wind	  
Dealing	  with	  the	  dynamic	  effect	  of	  the	  wind	  there	  are	  two	  different	  phenomena	  that	  should	  be	  inquired	  
separately.	  Basically	  when	  the	  wind	  impact	  a	  structure	  the	  wind	  has	  a	  natural	  frequency	  that	  could	  be	  in	  
the	  range	  of	  the	  natural	  frequency	  of	  vibration	  of	  the	  wind.	  When	  this	  happens	  the	  structure	  shows	  an	  
uncontrolled	  displacement	  that	  most	  likely	  lead	  to	  failure.	  Supposing	  that	  the	  wind	  natural	  frequency	  is	  in	  
the	  range	  of	  4-­‐6	  second,	  this	  kind	  of	  problem	  is	  related	  more	  to	  large	  span	  bridges	  that	  can	  have	  this	  kind	  
of	  range	  in	  its	  natural	  frequency.	  Wind	  is	  a	  complex	  phenomena	  that	  lead	  to	  several	  effect	  into	  the	  
structure.	  For	  simplicity	  its	  effects	  are	  divided	  in	  different	  separate	  analysis	  even	  if	  they	  occur	  all	  together.	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Buffeting	  
The	  buffeting	  analysis	  of	  bridge	  structures	  considers	  both,	  the	  aero-­‐elastic	  behavior	  of	  the	  structures	  and	  
the	  wind	  loading	  correlation.	  It	  is	  well-­‐known	  that	  the	  wind	  profile	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  mean	  velocity	  
and	  fluctuation	  due	  to	  turbulence.	  Generally	  the	  stochastic	  nature	  of	  wind	  loading	  in	  the	  space	  and	  time	  is	  
not	  accounted	  in	  the	  analysis.	  
Buffeting	  analysis	  is	  a	  trial	  to	  simulate	  the	  fluctuation	  of	  the	  wind	  from	  the	  mean	  value	  putting	  25%	  of	  the	  
wind	  load	  as	  amplitude	  of	  a	  cosine	  function	  to	  represent	  these	  fluctuations.	  Considering	  the	  wind	  load	  
parallel	  to	  the	  deck	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  erase	  the	  randomness	  of	  the	  wind	  into	  the	  space.	  	  
The	  analysis	  done	  by	  S.A.P	  and	  confined	  at	  the	  first	  5	  mode	  shapes	  that	  represent	  almost	  the	  90%	  of	  the	  
general	  displacement,	  shows	  an	  actual	  better	  answer	  of	  the	  Webnet	  Arch	  in	  term	  of	  general	  displacement.	  
The	  better	  answer	  is	  due	  basically	  to	  the	  greater	  stiffness	  of	  the	  net	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  general	  stiffer	  bridge	  so	  
less	  inclined	  to	  move,	  and	  a	  much	  smaller	  period	  that	  put	  the	  period	  of	  the	  structure	  far	  away	  from	  the	  
period	  of	  resonance.	  	  
Fluttering	  
Flutter	  is	  a	  potentially	  dangerous	  vibration.	  The	  aerodynamic	  forces	  on	  a	  bridge,	  which	  are	  in	  nearly	  same	  
natural	  mode	  of	  vibration	  of	  the	  bridge,	  cause	  periodic	  motion.	  Flutter	  occurs	  on	  bridges	  so	  that	  a	  positive	  
feedback	  occurs	  between	  the	  aerodynamic	  forces	  and	  natural	  vibration	  of	  the	  bridge.	  In	  essence,	  the	  
vibration	  movements	  of	  the	  bridge	  increase	  the	  aerodynamic	  load	  which	  in	  turns	  cause	  further	  movement	  
of	  the	  bridge.	  This	  kind	  of	  phenomena	  occurs	  in	  both	  structures	  and	  in	  term	  of	  displacement	  the	  
comparison	  between	  the	  two	  structures	  affirms	  again	  what	  it	  is	  said	  before	  for	  buffeting	  that	  having	  a	  
stiffer	  structure	  reduces	  the	  displacement.	  
More	  interesting	  is	  a	  longevity	  analysis	  due	  to	  this	  phenomena.	  Assuming	  to	  have	  the	  same	  range	  of	  stress	  
fluctuation	  do	  the	  wind,	  the	  fatigue	  strength	  depends	  on	  shape	  of	  the	  fracture	  inside	  the	  cables	  that	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  assume	  similar	  and	  presence	  of	  imperfections.	  Assuming	  to	  use	  the	  same	  material	  in	  the	  net	  
and	  in	  cables,	  imperfections	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  a	  big	  element	  instead	  of	  a	  smaller	  one	  so	  that	  the	  
Web-­‐net	  bridge	  answer	  under	  fatigue	  is	  much	  better	  than	  a	  single	  cables	  bridges.	  
Longevity	  is	  one	  the	  most	  important	  cause	  of	  collapse	  in	  bridges	  and	  so	  	  very	  important	  in	  designing	  a	  
bridge.	  	  
Thinking	  about	  live	  load	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  load	  in	  not	  sustained	  but	  in	  transition.	  In	  this	  case	  is	  not	  
critical	  the	  strength	  analysis	  that	  could	  be	  sufficient	  but	  not	  enough	  if	  it	  is	  not	  considered	  the	  dynamic	  
affect	  due	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  vehicles	  in	  term	  of	  vibrations	  and	  fatigue	  problems	  due	  to	  periodic	  cycles	  of	  
loading	  during	  the	  bridge	  life.	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Vortex	  shedding	  
When	  wind	  flows	  around	  a	  bridge,	  it	  would	  be	  slowed	  down	  when	  in	  contact	  with	  its	  surface	  and	  forms	  
boundary	  layer.	  At	  some	  location,	  this	  boundary	  layer	  tends	  to	  separate	  from	  the	  bridge	  body	  owing	  to	  
excessive	  curvature.	  This	  results	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  vortex,	  which	  revises	  the	  pressure	  distribution	  over	  the	  
bridge	  surface.	  	  
The	  vortex	  formed	  may	  not	  be	  symmetric	  about	  the	  bridge	  body	  and	  different	  lifting	  forces	  are	  formed	  
around	  the	  body.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  motion	  of	  bridge	  body	  subject	  to	  these	  vortexes	  shall	  be	  transverse	  when	  
compared	  with	  the	  incoming	  wind	  flow.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  transverse	  forces	  not	  completely	  symmetric	  cause	  
torque	  in	  the	  deck.	  As	  the	  frequency	  of	  vortex	  shedding	  approaches	  the	  natural	  frequencies	  of	  the	  bridges,	  
resonant	  vibrations	  often	  occur,	  the	  amplitude	  of	  which	  depends	  on	  the	  damping	  in	  the	  system	  and	  the	  
motion	  of	  the	  wind	  relative	  to	  the	  bridges.	  
In	  term	  of	  torsional	  answer	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  actual	  improvement	  in	  suspension	  and	  network	  
arch	  bridges	  is	  reached	  using	  inclined	  cables	  that	  resist	  torque	  by	  bracing	  the	  structure	  in	  the	  cross	  section	  
plane.	  Straight	  cables	  do	  not	  do	  that.	  Having	  said	  that	  the	  problem	  to	  analyze	  is	  always	  in	  term	  of	  stiffness	  
of	  the	  general	  system.	  Web-­‐net	  bridges	  show	  a	  general	  greater	  stiffness,	  that	  allow	  this	  structure	  to	  resist	  
better	  in	  case	  of	  torque,	  but	  more	  important	  the	  deck	  is	  stiffened	  by	  the	  net	  in	  a	  more	  homogeneous	  way	  
so	  that	  avoiding	  local	  problems	  in	  the	  deck	  particularly	  dangerous	  in	  case	  of	  torque	  into	  the	  deck.	  
	  
Seismic	  	  
In	  term	  of	  seismic	  analysis	  it	  is	  well-­‐known	  that	  for	  long	  span	  bridges	  is	  not	  a	  compelling	  problem	  due	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  natural	  frequencies	  of	  an	  earthquake	  and	  a	  large	  span	  bridge	  are	  far	  away.	  Avoiding	  the	  
dynamic	  effect	  of	  the	  resonance,	  the	  problem	  it	  could	  be	  tough	  as	  a	  static	  problem	  with	  the	  external	  force	  
proportional	  to	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  system	  mostly	  related	  to	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  deck.	  So	  in	  this	  case	  as	  just	  
said	  before	  there	  is	  no	  comparison	  between	  Web-­‐net	  bridges	  that	  allow	  a	  lightweight	  deck	  with	  network	  
arch	  and	  suspension	  bridges	  that	  need	  a	  heavier	  deck	  for	  compression	  and	  torsion.	  
Dealing	  with	  small	  span	  bridges	  it	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  the	  dynamic	  effect	  because	  of	  the	  natural	  
frequency	  of	  the	  structure	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  range	  of	  earthquake	  frequency.	  Even	  if	  the	  induced	  force	  is	  less	  
in	  the	  Web-­‐net	  due	  to	  the	  less	  weight	  of	  the	  deck,	  the	  dynamic	  analysis	  is	  more	  compelling.	  Assuming	  that	  
the	  frequencies	  of	  the	  Web-­‐net	  and	  Network	  bridges	  are	  similar	  both	  system	  are	  going	  to	  get	  into	  
resonance	  in	  a	  similar	  range.	  In	  this	  case	  what	  rules	  the	  answer	  of	  the	  of	  the	  system	  is	  the	  natural	  
frequency	  of	  the	  system	  (m,	  k)	  and	  the	  damping	  of	  the	  structure.	  Thinking	  in	  this	  case	  at	  the	  same	  deck	  for	  
Web-­‐net	  and	  Network	  arch	  bridges	  the	  damping	  it	  s	  the	  same	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  system	  is	  the	  same	  but	  the	  
stiffness	  is	  different	  and	  help	  the	  Web-­‐net	  arch	  to	  have	  a	  better	  answer.	  With	  different	  decks	  it	  is	  more	  
difficult	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  final	  result	  because	  having	  an	  heavier	  deck	  means	  more	  inertia	  against	  the	  
displacement	  but	  also	  a	  greater	  external	  force	  that	  loads	  the	  system	  so	  these	  two	  effect	  could	  cancel	  each	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other.	  Having	  a	  lightweight	  deck	  means	  a	  structure	  more	  inclined	  to	  move	  due	  to	  less	  inertia	  but	  loaded	  by	  
smaller	  external	  force.	  Also	  in	  this	  case	  the	  different	  between	  the	  two	  system	  is	  the	  more	  stiffness	  and	  
braced	  structure	  of	  the	  Webnet	  that	  generate	  a	  better	  structural	  system	  
	  
Redundancy	  
The	  ultimate	  trend	  of	  the	  code	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  redundancy	  of	  the	  structures	  to	  have	  alternative	  load	  
paths	  in	  case	  of	  unexpected	  failures.	  	  
There	  are	  bridge	  structures	  that	  are	  intrinsically	  not	  redundant	  and	  so	  they	  cannot	  provide	  alternative	  load	  
paths.	  In	  this	  chapter	  the	  redundancy	  is	  dealt	  in	  particular	  in	  its	  relationship	  with	  progressive	  collapse	  due	  
to	  cable	  loss.	  	  
Cable	  loss	  is	  generally	  tough	  as	  a	  static	  phenomena	  of	  having	  a	  structure	  without	  a	  member.	  Actually	  the	  
cable	  loss	  is	  a	  dynamic	  event	  and	  it	  is	  related	  mostly	  with	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  event,	  the	  number	  of	  member	  
engaged.	  	  
Focusing	  the	  attention	  on	  Arch	  Bridges,	  according	  with	  the	  results	  of	  the	  article	  “	  Some	  consideration	  in	  the	  
design	  of	  long	  span	  bridges	  against	  progressive	  collapse”,	  comparing	  a	  network	  arch	  bridge	  with	  vertical	  
suspenders	  and	  inclined	  suspenders	  it	  is	  demonstrated	  that	  inclined	  suspenders	  reduced	  moment	  demands	  
in	  the	  tie	  girder	  under	  plate	  loss	  and	  they	  reduced	  also	  moment	  demands	  in	  arch	  rib	  and	  enhance	  the	  
stability	  of	  the	  former	  in	  case	  of	  cable	  loss.	  	  
	  
	  
The	  fundamental	  step	  is	  to	  change	  vertical	  suspenders	  with	  inclined	  ones	  to	  have	  a	  hyperstatic	  structure	  
with	  the	  ability	  for	  load	  redistribution	  in	  case	  of	  single	  or	  multiple	  cable	  loss.	  Going	  further	  on	  this	  analysis,	  
the	  more	  redundant	  the	  structure	  is	  the	  better	  the	  redistribution	  of	  the	  system	  is.	  For	  this	  starting	  from	  
network	  arch	  bridges,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  point	  out	  that	  if	  the	  tied	  girder,	  instead	  of	  cable	  with	  few	  connections	  
each	  other,	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  net	  characterized	  by	  higher	  redundancy,	  the	  Webnet	  arch	  provides	  better	  
answer	  also	  against	  cable	  loss.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Webnet	  arch	  a	  lot	  of	  members	  are	  engaged	  in	  redistributing	  
the	  extra	  load	  and	  both	  the	  arch	  rib	  and	  the	  tied	  girder	  shows	  more	  stability	  and	  less	  moment	  demands.	  In	  
this	  case	  the	  Webnet	  arch	  is	  just	  the	  logical	  consequence	  of	  the	  passage	  from	  vertical	  suspender	  to	  inclined	  
one	  increasing	  the	  redundancy	  of	  the	  former	  to	  a	  higher	  level.	  The	  Web-­‐Net	  guarantees	  a	  greater	  
redundancy	  and	  so	  all	  the	  positive	  consequences	  in	  term	  of	  alternative	  load	  paths,	  cable	  loss	  and	  
progressive	  collapse	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Conclusions	  
the	  application	  of	  network	  structure	  also	  in	  bridges	  where	  network	  structures	  are	  basically	  never	  used.	  This	  
lack	  of	  case	  history	  and	  examples	  give	  me	  the	  chance	  to	  envision	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  suspension	  system	  that	  
instead	  of	  using	  cables	  uses	  the	  Web-­‐Net.	  After	  having	  proposed	  the	  Web-­‐net	  Bridge	  I	  passed	  over	  a	  
challenge	  between	  having	  a	  net	  or	  having	  a	  cable	  in	  Network	  Arch	  and	  Suspension	  Bridge	  with	  particular	  
attention	  of	  dynamic	  effects	  and	  redundancy	  in	  case	  of	  unexpected	  events.	  After	  having	  done	  all	  the	  
analysis	  what	  it	  comes	  out	  is	  that	  a	  net	  used	  instead	  of	  cables	  gives	  a	  general	  better	  answer	  of	  the	  
structures	  due	  to	  the	  greater	  stiffness	  and	  so	  smaller	  displacement.	  Furthermore	  a	  net	  bracing	  more	  and	  in	  
a	  more	  homogenues	  way	  the	  arch	  and	  the	  deck	  make	  these	  bridge	  less	  inclined	  to	  have	  local	  failure.	  In	  
term	  of	  longevity	  there	  is	  no	  match	  between	  net	  and	  cables	  because	  smaller	  rope	  are	  actually	  less	  inclined	  
to	  have	  fractures.	  Finally	  the	  more	  redundancy	  of	  the	  net	  make	  these	  bridge	  more	  performing	  in	  case	  of	  
cable	  loss	  and	  progressive	  collapse.	  	  
This	  research	  analyze	  the	  possibilities	  of	  using	  network	  structures	  in	  all	  the	  field	  of	  constructions:	  buildings	  
roofing	  and	  bridges.	  After	  this	  analysis	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  network	  structures	  could	  be	  a	  way	  to	  have	  very	  
efficient	  and	  performance	  structures.	  Particularly	  interesting	  was	  the	  analysis	  about	  bridges,	  where	  the	  
topic	  is	  almost	  not	  cover	  by	  the	  literature	  and	  case	  history,	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  suspension	  system	  for	  
bridges	  that	  could	  open	  a	  new	  path	  in	  this	  field	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  more	  safe	  efficient	  and	  cost	  effective	  
bridges.	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